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Over the last five years, Venezuelans have left their home country in historic numbers in 
order to escape economic and political crises at home.  Although scattering across the globe, 
most Venezuelans are re-locating to other countries in Latin America.  Argentina has received 
over 125,000 Venezuelan migrants since 2012, most of whom reside in the capital city of Buenos 
Aires.  The core of this thesis examines how well these migrants are integrating economically 
into the Argentine workforce and to what extent underemployment is a problem.   
 To accomplish this objective, 278 Venezuelan adult migrants residing in Argentina were 
surveyed about their experiences navigating the labor market in Argentina.  Interviews were also 
conducted with a variety of individuals from different backgrounds and levels of association with 
the Venezuelan migrant community in Argentina.  These included, among others, interviews 
with leaders of Venezuelan professional associations in medicine and engineering, the head of a 
prominent Venezuelan community outreach organization, an academic from Argentina’s 
National Research Council (CONICET), and a representative from Argentina’s Dirección 
Nacional de Migraciones (DNM).   
Findings show that underemployment is perceived as a serious problem among 
Venezuelan migrants with over 50% of survey respondents claiming to be underemployed.  
Causes of underemployment were found to result from different factors that often vary based on 
profession.  These primarily include difficulties with obtaining degree accreditation, the poor 
state of the current Argentine economy, a mismatch between the skills of Venezuelan workers 
and the demands of the Argentine economy, high costs of living in regions where suitable jobs 
are available, and in some cases, discrimination.  The underemployment of Venezuelan 
engineers and medical doctors, two of the largest professional groups among Venezuelans, was 
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examined more closely and in both cases underemployment was found to be a problem, but for 
different reasons.      
The Argentine government has already taken important actions towards reducing 
underemployment among Venezuelan migrants and facilitating their economic integration that 
are already showing signs of success.  Recommendations for additional action that can be taken 
are offered and encouraged since reducing underemployment will be beneficial not only for 
migrants but also for the economic health of Argentina in the long run.  These include 
subsidizing the cost of housing in areas of the country that are currently prohibitively expensive 
for migrants to live and work, offering programs of micro-credit for migrant entrepreneurs or 
independent contractors, fining employers who refuse to hire migrants that have only provisional 
residency, and allowing migrants to begin the degree accreditation process earlier with only 
provisional residency.  However, the current poor state of the Argentine economy and the need 
to address the economic concerns of natives will likely limit the attention and resources given 
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 The International Organization for Migration (IOM), a United Nations (UN) affiliate, 
estimates that close to four million people have fled Venezuela in recent years as a result of the 
country’s ongoing economic and political crises in what has become the largest displacement of 
individuals in Latin American history.  The IOM also estimates that 73% of these migrants have 
elected to stay in South America with most going to Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.1   However, 
Argentina has also emerged as a popular destination for migrants, receiving 127,152 
Venezuelans between 2012-2018 according to Argentina’s Dirección Nacional de Migraciones 
(DNM).2  As the crisis in Venezuela rages on, the percentage of migrants going to Argentina 
seems likely to increase as other countries in the region have begun imposing policies aimed at 
restricting Venezuelan immigration.   
 This study addresses primarily how well Venezuelan migrants to Argentina are 
integrating into the national workforce.  It pays particular attention to underemployment and its 
prevalence among highly educated Venezuelan professionals, which describes a high proportion 
of Venezuelan migrants to Argentina.  This study also explores what measures Argentine 
policymakers have already taken to facilitate and improve Venezuelan migrants’ inclusion in the 
labor market as well as what additional measures can be taken.  As part of this discussion of the 
scale, nature, and solutions to underemployment, two of the largest professional groups of 
Venezuelan migrants, engineers and doctors, are looked at in greater detail.   
 Data for this research investigation was collected through a combination of surveys and 
interviews.  Specifically, 278 Venezuelan male and female adult migrants residing in Argentina 
were surveyed about their experiences navigating the labor market in Argentina.  For simplicity 
 
1 “Migration Trends in the Americas: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.” 
2 “Data y Estadistica Venezolanos.” 
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and clarification purposes, this survey will be referred to as the Economic Integration Survey.  In 
addition to this survey, interviews were conducted with a variety of individuals from different 
backgrounds and levels of association with the Venezuelan migrant community in Argentina.  
These included, among others, interviews with leaders of Venezuelan professional associations, 
the head of a prominent Venezuelan community outreach organization, an academic from 
Argentina’s National Research Council (CONICET) who is well versed in the study of 
immigrant groups in Argentina, and a representative from the DNM.   
 A series of conclusions can be made from the research findings.  First and foremost, both 
unemployment and underemployment are serious problems among Venezuelan migrants, with 
rates of 36% and 52% among respondents respectively.  This holds true in the cases of surveyed 
Venezuelan engineers and medical doctors, who also registered high rates of unemployment and 
underemployment.  Second, underemployment among migrants results from a variety of factors 
that often differ based on profession.  These primarily include difficulties with obtaining degree 
accreditation, the poor state of the current Argentine economy, a mismatch between the skills of 
Venezuelan workers and the demands of the Argentine economy, high costs of living in regions 
where suitable jobs are available, and in some cases, discrimination.   Finally, Argentina has 
already taken important measures to address these problems by, for example, reducing the 
requirements for residency and degree accreditation, collecting more and better data about 
arriving migrants, and beginning development of a new nationwide digital employment search 
platform.   
The variation in factors that affect employment opportunities in different professions 
makes providing quick and easy recommendations to the government on how to reduce 
underemployment and improve migrant economic integration a challenge.  Nevertheless, there 
are still some actions that can be taken by the Argentine government to alleviate migrant 
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underemployment.  These include subsidizing the cost of housing in areas of the country that are 
currently prohibitively expensive for migrants to live and work, offering programs of micro-
credit for migrant entrepreneurs or independent contractors, fining employers who refuse to hire 
migrants that only have provisional residency, and allowing migrants to begin the degree 
accreditation process earlier with only provisional residency.   
In the end it is important for the Argentine government to help migrants obtain 
employment that is commensurate with their education, experience, and professional 
qualifications.  This is because not only will this improve the welfare of migrants who have 
already suffered through significant hardship but also because it will help fill important regional 
labor gaps in the Argentine economy.  Nevertheless, doing so may be difficult given the current 
pro-longed economic recession in Argentina and the possibility that an anti-immigrant backlash 
may emerge if native Argentines feel that they are not given precedence by their own 
government during these difficult economic times.   
Purpose of the study 
 
This study was performed with the ultimate goal of trying to help reduce 
underemployment among Venezuelan migrants living in Argentina.  Multiple studies cite that 
underemployment negatively affects people’s mental, physical, and financial well-being.  For 
Venezuelan migrants, these stresses are in addition to those that come from learning to adapt to 
life in a new country.  With this understanding and after personally meeting several 
underemployed Venezuelan migrants living in Argentina during the summer of 2018, I set out to 
design a study to collect data specifically about migrant underemployment that could then be 
presented to Argentine policymakers.  The hope is that the findings in this report will firstly 
inform policymakers about the problem of Venezuelan migrant underemployment, secondly 
convince them as to why migrant underemployment is a serious problem that has important 
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ramifications on the economic health of Argentina, and finally encourage them to take action 
upon the recommendations made in the report or otherwise that may help curtail the problem.  
Realizing the extreme hardships already faced by Venezuelan migrants forced to flee 
their homeland, the hope is that this report will improve their livelihood by helping them obtain 
better paying jobs that are consistent with their education and professional backgrounds.  
Additionally, reducing Venezuelan migrant underemployment will also help Argentina maximize 
the economic benefits of “brain gain,” as migrants are able to employ their significant human 
capital in a more productive capacity.  Since human capital is an important ingredient in 
economic growth and innovation, maximizing its potential by reducing migrant 
underemployment should be a priority.  In addressing the issue of migrant underemployment, 
Argentine policymakers should therefore consider that its reduction would not only be beneficial 
for migrants but also for the Argentine economy.         
Other studies on recent Venezuelan migration to Argentina 
 
Dr. Roberto Salvador Aruj from the Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero performed 
one of the earliest and most comprehensive studies of Venezuelan migration to Argentina in July 
2017.  In his report titled La Migracion de Venezolanos en la Argentina, 1200 Venezuelan 
migrants were surveyed in six Argentine cities including Buenos Aires, La Plata, Cordoba, 
Rosario, Mendoza, and Neuquén.3  Aruj’s study collected significant demographic and 
socioeconomic data about migrants as well as scratched the surface in measuring the 
community’s economic, social, and cultural integration into Argentine society.   
Aruj’s main conclusions are that most Venezuelan migrants to Argentina are young, well 
educated professionals that are not a financial burden to the Argentine state but on the contrary 
are important contributors to the economic growth of Argentina.  According to Aruj, “…It can be 
 
3 Roberto Salvador Aruj, “La Migracion de Venezolanos en la Argentina.” 
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sure that with the integration of migrant workers new jobs are created, levels of consumption are 
increased, and on numerous occasions, contributions are made that improve the productivity of 
the economy.  There is no doubt that around migrant communities there is a vast net of services 
that is created that employs as many natives as migrants [translated from Spanish].”4  
Nevertheless, there are important limitations to Aruj’s study that this thesis hopes to 
overcome.  The first of which is that the data in Aruj’s report is already over two years old in 
what is a rapidly evolving phenomenon as the number of Venezuelan migrants to Argentina 
continues to increase dramatically.  During this time, there have also been important changes in 
Argentina’s policies towards Venezuelan migrants that are not accounted for in Aruj’s study.  
For example, questions asking migrants about their experiences with the degree accreditation 
process in Aruj’s study are less relevant since the rules and procedures for Venezuelans in 
Argentina changed in 2018.   
Moreover, Aruj’s study is geographically limited in its approach as it only includes 
migrants from the six previously cited Argentine cities.  Data collected for this thesis shows that 
Venezuelan migrants have spread far and wide throughout Argentina in significant numbers that 
are worth being surveyed.  Additionally, Aruj’s assessment of economic integration and 
specifically underemployment is basic and incomplete.  Only one question related to 
underemployment, specifically skills-related underemployment, appears on the survey.  No 
questions are included about “time-related underemployment” nor whether migrants who claim 
to be skills-related underemployed desire other employment that better utilizes their education, 
skills, and professional experience.  Also lacking is a discussion on the causes of migrant 
underemployment.  In short, Aruj’s attention towards the issue of underemployment provides 
 




some useful general insights but does not enable a more detailed and nuanced understanding of 
the scope and nature of underemployment.  It also cannot be used to accurately assess the 
underemployment of migrants since international standards for measuring underemployment are 
not employed.   
 Another study by the IOM titled Monitoreo de Flujo de Poblacion Venezolana surveyed 
395 Venezuelan migrants at three different Argentine arrival points from July 10th- July 16, 
2018.5  Two of these arrival points were the two main airports in Buenos Aires while the third 
was a border crossing at Puerto Iguazu along the border with Brazil.  The main purpose of this 
study was to gather demographic and socio-economic data on arriving migrants.  Other areas of 
investigation included migrants’ health, travel itineraries, travel costs, travel companions, and 
whether migrants have economic dependents back in Venezuela or elsewhere.  Valuable insight 
is also included about the regions of Venezuela where migrants come from, if migrants had 
resided in a country other than Venezuela before coming to Argentina, and the average cost of 
different types of transportation between Venezuela and Argentina.  
Overall, the findings from the demographic and socioeconomic data collected in this 
report largely corroborate with that which was collected by Aruj.   Its findings indicate that most 
arriving Venezuelans are young, educated professionals from middle to upper middle-class 
backgrounds.  However, the primary limitation to the IOM report is that it only collects data on 
arriving migrants and does not include any information about their experiences after arrival.  Nor 
does it provide any information on Venezuelan migrants that have already been residing in 
Argentina.  Data in the IOM report is also somewhat compromised by the fact that not all 
migrants surveyed had Argentina as their final destination as 10% of respondents claimed to be 
in transit to another country.   
 
5 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Monitoreo de Flujo de Poblacion Venzolana, Argentina.” 
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Furthermore, both studies were limited by their singular approach of only using surveys 
with close-ended questions.  The lack of open-ended survey questions and insight from 
interviews means that the voices and opinions of Venezuelan migrants are not incorporated in 
these studies.  Additionally, no insight nor data was collected regarding the Argentine 
perspective on the issue of Venezuelan migration to Argentina in either of these reports.  This 
thesis seeks to complement these studies and deepen our understanding of migrant experiences 
by offering Venezuelan migrants the opportunity to voice their thoughts and opinions through 
open-ended survey questions and by incorporating insight from knowledgeable insiders in the 
Venezuelan community, academia, and the Argentine government.  While both the Aruj paper 
and IOM report only examine Venezuelan migrants on one level as an entire population, this 
thesis also looks at specific subsets in detail, most notably Venezuelan engineers and medical 
doctors.    
Organization 
 
 Chapter I provides a detailed discussion about the purpose and methodology of the 
research performed as part of this thesis.  Also referenced are other studies that have been 
conducted about recent Venezuelan migration to Argentina and their contributions to the field of 
knowledge on the topic.  Chapter I concludes by examining in detail the concept of 
underemployment, the socioeconomic costs associated with underemployment, and the main 
causes of underemployment at the micro and macroeconomic levels.  Chapter II discusses the 
motivating factors for Venezuelan migrants to leave Venezuela and emigrate to Argentina.  Also 
included in this chapter is a historical overview of the current economic and political crises in 




 Chapter III develops a demographic and socioeconomic profile of surveyed migrants 
based on common characteristics and trends discerned from the data.  Migrants’ gender, ages, 
education levels, professions, and economic classes are all described as a necessary runup to the 
later discussion on underemployment.  Chapter IV is a comprehensive discussion of surveyed 
migrants’ experiences navigating the Argentine labor market.  Examined are the topics of 
legality, employment situation and formality, the job search process, income, remittances, and 
discrimination in the workplace or hiring process.  The extent to which surveyed migrants are 
beneficiaries of direct government financial assistance in Argentina is also reviewed.   
Chapter V is focused on underemployment and starts by outlining the specific 
methodology used to create underemployment-related survey questions for the Economic 
Integration Survey. Survey results measuring the extent of underemployment among Venezuelan 
migrants in Argentina are presented and the likely causes of this underemployment are discussed.  
The jobs underemployed respondents currently have in Argentina are then compared with their 
education levels, stated professions, and previous employment in Venezuela.  Chapter V 
concludes with a more detailed analysis of underemployment among two of the most common 
Venezuelan migrant professional groups in Argentina, engineers and medical doctors, using 
insights from both survey and interview findings.    
Finally, Chapter VI describes the various actions Argentine policymakers have already 
taken to reduce underemployment and improve the economic integration of Venezuelan 
migrants.  Recommendations are then offered for further reducing underemployment among 
Venezuelan migrants.  Also examined are overall migrant satisfaction levels in Argentina and 
under what circumstances, if at all, migrants would return to Venezuela.  The chapter concludes 
by looking at the future of Venezuelan migration to Argentina and what the likely political 




















































Original research through the use of surveys and the performance of interviews 
constitutes an integral part of this study.  All survey material and interview questions were pre-
approved by Columbia University’s Institutional Review Board.  Surveys were distributed and 
taken online between June 1st and July 6th 2019.  Interviews were conducted in-person in 
Argentina during the same time period.   
The Economic Integration Survey was generated and distributed using online software 
provided by SurveyMonkey, a leading survey-development company.  Only respondents who 
answered “yes” to preliminary questions confirming that they were Venezuelan immigrants to 
Argentina over the age of 18 were permitted to begin the survey.  Respondents were then asked a 
series of open and close-ended questions regarding their demographic characteristics, socio-
economic status, experiences navigating the Argentine labor market, employment situation, and 
overall satisfaction living in Argentina.  A variety of question types were utilized including 
multiple choice, checkboxes, star ratings, dropdown menus, matrix/rating scales, ranking 
questions, and comment boxes.  The survey was written in Spanish and had an average 
completion time of roughly 16 minutes.   
Overall, 278 male and female respondents residing in different parts of Argentina 
successfully completed the survey.  Participants were found using a variety of approaches.  
These included tapping into pre-existing personal relationships with Venezuelan migrants, 
marketing to migrant groups on social media, and enlisting the help of Venezuelan outreach 
organizations and professional associations to spread the word about this study.  A flyer 
describing the purpose and goals of the study was also distributed in-person and online to 
prospective respondents.  All responses were anonymous and no identifying personal 
information such as names was solicited or collected.    
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Interviews were performed in Spanish, recorded, and averaged one hour in length.  
Questions asked were largely open-ended and focused on supplementing the data collected from 
the survey and adding a personal, human touch to understanding the current situation of 
Venezuelan migration to Argentina.  Interviews also provided perspectives of the migratory 
phenomenon from different groups, some of which were not represented in the survey study.  For 
example, the interview with the representative from the DNM offered an Argentine-centric 
viewpoint by providing insight on the official position of the Argentine national government on 
the issue.   
A more detailed focus on Venezuelan engineers and medical doctors was decided upon 
because they represent two of the three largest Venezuelan professional groups in Argentina, 
access was available to leaders of professional associations in these fields, and because the 
specificity of these professions made isolating and measuring the data feasible.  In contrast, the 
expansive nature of the second largest group of Venezuelan professionals in Argentina, business 
professionals, creates additional difficulties in analysis since there are so many different types of 
business professionals from widely different sectors and fields.               
Furthermore, it should be noted that this thesis is not concerned with advocating for or 
against Venezuelan migration to Argentina.  The focus is not to examine the pros and cons of an 
open or closed immigration policy in Argentina.  Since Argentina has already decided on an 
open immigration policy, the purpose of this thesis is rather to first examine the current state of 
migrant economic integration and then offer recommendations towards its improvement with a 
focus on the issue of underemployment.  In other words, one of the primary goals is to help 
Argentina maximize the potential of migrants whom the state has already committed to 
accepting.  This is particularly important since according to the DNM the government’s current 
disposition towards accepting Venezuelan migrants is unlikely to change regardless of the 
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ascension to power of a new presidential administration on December 10th following the victory 
of the opposition party, Frente de Todos, on October 28th.   
Defining underemployment 
 
 Underemployment is an elusive term that often carries different meanings in varying 
contexts.  Its ambiguity stands in contrast to the more clearly defined states of employment and 
unemployment.  Indeed, the concept of underemployment is fluid and has evolved substantially 
in public policy circles over the last century.6  Understanding this, this thesis follows the 
conventions of underemployment as defined by the International Labor Organization (ILO).7 
This is because the guidelines set forth by the ILO are recognized internationally and provide a 
framework for standardized data collection and analysis. 
   Measured over a short reference period, such as a week, the ILO divides a country’s 
population into three mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories: the employed, the 
unemployed, and the economically inactive.  Under this scheme, people working in the informal 
sectors of the economy should be counted with the employed.  However, as Bracha and Burke 
point out in their study Who Counts as Employed? Informal Work, Employment Status and Labor 
Market Slack, a minority percentage of informal workers are often erroneously excluded from 
the workforce participation rate.8   
Underemployment is a subcategory of the employed population that represents workers 
that are being underutilized in respects to their productive capacities.9  According to the ILO, full 
employment requires that: 
 
6 International Labour Organization, “History.” 
7 The Internal Labour Organization (ILO) is a UN Agency established in 1919 devoted to setting labor standards and 
advancing workers’ rights and opportunities.  The ILO works together with workers, businesses, and governments to 
gather data and shape labor-related policies.      
8 Bracha and Burke, “Who Counts as Employed? Informal Work, Employment Status, and Labor Market Slack,” 1. 




“(i) there is work for all persons who are willing to work and look for work; (ii) that such 
work is as productive as possible; and (iii) that they have the freedom to choose the 
employment and that each worker has all the possibilities to acquire the necessary skills 
to get the employment that most suits them and to use in this employment such skills and 
other qualifications that they possess.”10   
 
Under this definition, workers are designated as underemployed when they fail to meet 
stipulation (ii) and potentially aspects of stipulation (iii).  ILO literature also tends to measure 
underemployment in the context of “alternative employment situations.”  In these cases, 
underemployment occurs if the productive capacity or wellbeing of a worker is less than that of 
an “alternative employment situation” for which the worker is qualified.11       
 More specifically, the ILO breaks underemployment down into two subcategories that are 
not mutually exclusive.  The first is time-related underemployment, also known as visible 
underemployment, and refers to underemployment resulting from an incommensurate number of 
hours of work.  This form of underemployment includes workers who are willing and able to 
work more hours and is often associated with part-time workers looking for full-time work.  
Workers in this state of underemployment often look to supplement hours worked by taking on 
additional jobs, replacing a current job with another that offers more hours, or by working more 
hours in their current job.  It is important to note that time-related underemployment only 
measures those workers who, after taking account all of their various jobs, are working less 
hours than the amount designated as the national threshold for full employment during a certain 
reference period.12  For example, if it is determined that full employment in the United States 
equates to working at least 35 hours per week, workers who already meet or exceed this amount 
but desire more hours of work are not considered to be time-related underemployed.  
 
10  International Labour Organization, “Unemployment Statistics.” 
11 International Labour Organization, “Resolution Concerning the Measurement of Underemployment and 
Inadequate Employment Situations,” 1. 
12 Ibid., 2. 
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 The ILO’s second category of underemployment is referred to as inadequate employment 
situations, or invisible underemployment.  This form of underemployment is much more broad 
than time-related underemployment and includes workers that are willing and available to 
change their current employment situation for “reasons that limit their capacities and well-
being.”13  The ILO stresses that this determination is based on workers’ own assessments of their 
work and can include any array of factors that limit an individual’s productivity or job 
performance.  Some examples include: “inadequate use and mismatch of occupational skills; 
inadequate income in current job(s); excessive hours of work; precarious job(s); inadequate 
tools, equipment or training for the assigned tasks; inadequate social services; travel to work 
difficulties; variable, arbitrary or inconvenient work schedules; recurring work stoppages 
because of delivery failures of raw material or energy; prolonged non-payment of wages; long 
overdue payments from customers.”14   
 Since this second category is quite expansive in nature, this study only focuses on the 
skills-related aspect of inadequate employment situations.  Underemployment is therefore 
measured on the premise that workers in their current job(s) are not utilizing their skills or 
human capital to the best of their ability and are willing and able to switch to a job that better 
matches their education and occupational skillsets.  Human capital in this study refers to work 
experience, on-the-job training, and formal education.   
In summary, the research performed in this study examines and refers to 
underemployment as defined by the ILO.  This includes time-related underemployment and a 
narrower definition of inadequate employment situations that includes only skill-related 
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underemployment.  In addition, only involuntary underemployment is considered 
underemployment as part of this study.     
Classifying underemployment  
 
 The research performed in this study also analyzes underemployment using a 
classification system developed by the authors Glyde, Snyden, and Stemberger in their study 
Underemployment: definition, causes, and measurement.  In this study, underemployment is 
categorized as being either “micro-underemployment” or “macro-underemployment.”  Micro-
underemployment refers to the underemployment of individuals of a certain occupation relative 
to other individuals in the same occupation who have the same or similar levels of human 
capital.  In this case, the individual’s rate of return from their human capital investment is 
compared to that of the occupation’s numeraire, or group average.  If the rate of return is lower, 
it is said that the individual is micro-underemployed and not utilizing her skills as productively 
as others in her cohort.15   
A hypothetical example of micro-underemployment would be an American law school 
graduate who waits tables and earns $20,000 per year while the average American law school 
graduate works as a lawyer and earns $120,000 per year.  In this case micro-underemployment is 
explained by an underutilization of skills, yet in other cases it is the result of an undervaluation 
of skills.  An individual’s skills are undervalued when he is working in an occupation that 
matches his skillset but nonetheless is being paid less than the numeraire.16  An example would 
be an accountant working as an accountant but is being paid 20% less than other accountants 
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with similar experience, education, and skills.  In both forms, micro-underemployment is a result 
of other factors and individual characteristics other than human capital.17  
Macro-underemployment is inter-occupational in nature and looks at the differences in 
rate of return in human capital for the average member of a particular occupational group 
compared to the average member of another occupational group with different training and 
skillsets.18  Different from micro-underemployment, macro-underemployment makes 
comparisons between occupations rather than between individuals within an occupation.  As is 
probably suspected, macro-underemployment is usually a result of macroeconomic factors such 
as supply and demand.19  A hypothetical example would be the over-supply of doctors in Cuba 
that has forced many doctors to take jobs requiring lower levels of skill and offering less pay.  
The employment situation of doctors is then contrasted with that of other types of professionals 
in Cuba, say for example lawyers, who have made similar investments in human capital and are 
able to work in jobs that match their education and skillsets.  
The socioeconomic costs of underemployment 
 
The costs of underemployment to society are at the same time significant and often 
underestimated by policymakers.  At the macroeconomic level, it represents an economic 
inefficiency highlighted by the underutilization of the labor pool’s full potential.  Instead of 
contributing to the economy through high value-added output, highly skilled individuals are 
being utilized in low value-added occupations. In accordance with classical economic theory, 
lower wages resulting from underemployment lead to decreased consumption and consequently 
have an adverse effect on production and GDP.20  By increasing poverty levels, 
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underemployment also raises the financial burden on governments needed to provide social 
services.  Glyde, Snyden, and Stemberger even suggest that underemployment’s negative impact 
on a national economy is even more severe than that of unemployment.  Their reasoning stems 
from the notion that the underemployed population is likely significantly greater than the 
unemployed population.21   
In the United States (U.S.), for example, the unemployment rate is currently 3.8% which 
means 6,156,000 people are unemployed out of an estimated workforce of 162,000,000 people.22  
According to a 2016 PayScale23 underemployment report, 46% of American workers consider 
themselves underemployed.24  This would mean that 74,520,000 people in the U.S. are 
underemployed, 12 times the amount of unemployed workers.  Based on this data alone, it is 
impossible to say with any accuracy that underemployment carries a greater economic cost than 
unemployment but nonetheless is evidence of why underemployment is an important issue that 
must be addressed by policymakers.   
Professors David Bell and David Blanchflower in their paper Underemployment in the 
US and Europe contribute to this argument by using national employment and wage data to 
demonstrate that underemployment has had a more consequential impact on stifling wage growth 
in the U.S. and Europe than unemployment in the last decade.25  Moreover, underemployment 
has also been shown to lead to higher unemployment in what is known as “bumping down.”  
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Measurement,” 20. 
22 Statista, “Employment in the United States.” 
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Bumping down occurs when highly skilled workers who are underemployed take jobs away from 
low skilled workers, who subsequently then become unemployed.26  
At the individual level, there has been a positive correlation between underemployment 
and poor mental and physical health.  In the study High-skilled immigrants- low-skilled jobs: 
challenging everyday health, researchers Subedi and Rosenberg surveyed highly skilled 
immigrants living in Canada and found that work-related stress due to underemployment was an 
important factor in the development of depression, anxiety, weight gain, and a series of chronic 
health conditions.27  Additionally, underemployment has also been shown to have an adverse 
effect on social and economic mobility.  Since underemployment is often correlated with 
discrimination, as will be discussed, minorities and immigrants are often at a disadvantage and 
suffer from higher levels of opportunity inequality.28       




There are several factors that contribute to the micro-underemployment of a population.  
An important one is the lack of labor market information during the hiring and promotion of 
workers.  Inadequate information and communication can result in a disconnect between 
employers and employees regarding the nature and responsibilities of jobs that can ultimately 
lead to underemployment.  Poorly described or inaccurate job descriptions during the recruitment 
process is one such example.  Labor market information is also limited by the challenges and 
costs associated with matching employers with the best possible job applicants.  Despite 
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technological advances, there are still significant gaps in platforms and mediums that connect 
employers with a global pool of qualified applicants.  The inability of employers to account for 
forms of human capital other than formal education or work experience, such as innate abilities, 
further complicates the process.29   
Poor labor market information also can prevent applicants from determining where there 
is demand for their labor in the economy.  Similarly, poor market forecasting can exacerbate the 
problem of future micro and macro-underemployment by not providing students contemplating 
their career paths with information about future demand expectations.  In this case, the 
government can act as an important intermediary by encouraging firms to provide forecasts for 
manpower that can then be relayed to the public.30  The government’s large investment of 
billions of dollars every year in education should act as an incentive for soliciting information 
that will encourage students to study in areas where there will likely be future job opportunities.    
 A second factor that is a significant cause of micro-underemployment is discrimination.  
Many firms hire individuals based on reputations attached to certain groups and perceived truths.  
Even if there is statistical evidence supporting the unfavorable tendencies of a certain group of 
people, those in that group who do not follow those tendencies will inevitably face unfair 
discrimination.   For example, women have been historically proven to be less attached to the 
labor force than men due to reasons such as marriage and childbearing.  As a result, many 
employers will discount all women in the hiring process fearing that they are more likely to quit 
for these reasons.  Higher underemployment among women then ensues as they are turned down 
for higher skilled jobs and positions for which they are just as qualified as men.31  
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Other groups who also commonly face discrimination in the labor market include 
religious, ethnic, or racial minorities; disabled persons; members of the LGBT community; and 
immigrants.  Like in the case of women, discrimination towards these groups, often based on 
false perceptions, can act as a barrier to higher level job placement and lead to 
underemployment.32  Unfortunately, widespread discrimination can also discourage members of 
these groups from investing in human capital in the first place, such as education, if it is believed 
that the future return on their investment will be lower than that of others who do not experience 
discrimination.33  Long-term underemployment caused by discrimination can also further 
aggravate the problem and prevent eventual full employment by leading to the atrophy of 
workers’ skills and creating a negative perception among potential employers who frown upon 
long periods of time out of the skilled labor market.34   
A final primary cause of micro-underemployment is geographic distance and mobility.  
Jobs for certain professions may be concentrated in areas where many workers are not located.  
For these workers, the monetary and non-monetary costs of moving exceed what are the likely 
returns from better employment.  Consequently, these workers must accept less pleasing jobs in 
lower-skilled occupations or part-time work.  Mobility also often has a disproportionate effect on 
certain groups, such as women.  For example, wives often “follow” their husbands to a new 
place because the husband got a new and higher paying job.  Yet the labor market in the new 
location may not be as strong for the wife as it was for the husband and she may be forced to 
reluctantly accept a job that places her in a state of underemployment.35  
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Macro-underemployment, like micro-underemployment, is caused by a confluence of 
factors.  However, the focus is on how an entire occupational group as a whole is affected rather 
than certain individuals within the group.  For this reason, as the name suggests, macroeconomic 
changes in demand and supply for products and labor is considered a chief cause of macro-
underemployment36.  Demand for the labor of a certain profession in a national economy may be 
reduced due to an economic recession, changing consumer tastes, increased competition from 
abroad, or technological replacement.  During recessions, the probability of macro-
underemployment is highly correlated to the elasticity of demand for certain products and 
services.  Workers in professions that are more recession-proof, and therefore exhibit higher 
demand inelasticity, are less likely to suffer from macro-underemployment.37   
Moreover, the inflow of new graduates coupled with stagnant job growth can also lead to 
macro-underemployment through oversupply.  This relates to the previous discussion on poor 
labor market information and the lag time between changing market conditions and when 
students make career choices.38  In both cases of supply and demand-induced macro-
underemployment, members of affected professional fields are faced with fewer job prospects 
and are forced to take jobs that do not utilize their skills or are offered jobs only on a part-time 
basis.  Additionally, the high specificity of some occupations and the low degree of 
transferability of skills can worsen the instance of macro-underemployment as workers have 
trouble finding jobs in new fields that take advantage of their current knowledge and abilities.39      
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Causes of underemployment specific to migrants: 
 
Since the focus of this thesis in on the underemployment of migrants, it is important to 
point out a few causes of underemployment specific to this group.  This is because migrant 
workers often face additional labor market challenges compared to other groups of workers.  
First and foremost is the challenge of receiving legal working status in the destination country.  
In today’s world, many nations have strict immigration laws and limit the number of new 
migrants legally received every year.  Thus, skilled migrants forced to migrate illegally for 
different reasons will likely be underemployed as they are restricted access to the destination 
country’s formal economy. In some countries, legal migration status may also be subject to job 
restrictions meaning that even migrants that enter a country legally could potentially face 
underemployment if they are denied access to certain labor markets.    
Even if migrants are granted legal working status, there are usually significant and time-
consuming governmental bureaucratic obstacles for those looking to get foreign degrees, 
occupational licenses, or certifications accredited in the destination country.  Until these are 
overcome, highly skilled migrants are usually forced to work in jobs below the value of their 
human capital.  Moreover, for many migrants, language barriers can also lead to 
underemployment if they are unable to exercise their skillsets in the local language.  Accents 
could also play a role in underemployment if they reinforce discriminatory practices against 
migrants and reduce the likelihood of being hired for a job.  The extent to which these various 
causes of underemployment are present in the case of Venezuelan migrants living in Argentina 
















      
























Background on the economic and political crises in Venezuela 
 
Hugo Chávez and the seeds of crisis (1999-2013): 
 
 The current economic and political crises in Venezuela have their roots during the 
presidency of Hugo Chávez, who governed the Caribbean nation from 1999 until his death in 
March 2013.  Chávez brought to Venezuela a socialist agenda focused on improving the lot of 
Venezuela’s large number of impoverished citizens through reforms in healthcare, education, 
social security, food, and land.40  Key to his plan to reduce poverty were government subsidies 
on food and consumer goods, price controls, and access to virtually free gasoline for citizens.41   
Indeed, numerous economic indicators point to the success of Chávez’s reforms in reducing 
poverty.  For example, literacy rates improved and according to a 2013 report from the UN’s 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Venezuela was one of just 18 countries to reduce 
hunger by half in the previous 20 years.42 
 Nevertheless, Chávez’s ambitious economic agenda was accompanied by problematic 
policies that distorted markets and poised Venezuela for future economic difficulties.  To begin, 
Chávez funded his greatly expanded social apparatus primarily through oil revenues and 
borrowing from international creditors.  As seen in the Figure 1 below, oil prices were relatively 
high during Chávez’s tenure as president, making increased government spending and borrowing 
possible.  Yet, any significant drop in oil prices in a country where oil accounts for over 96% of 
exports, as would happen in 2014, seriously risked the viability of maintaining Chávez’s state-
funded social programs.43 
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Moreover, Chávez also hampered the private sector in Venezuela through expropriations 
across sectors, price controls, and steep and sudden annual rises in minimum wages.  
Inefficiency rose and domestic production fell as price controls disincentivized production and 
nationalized companies fell under the administration of incompetent managers.45  The slow death 
of the private sector was driven by and contributed to the growth of the petrostate as the 
Venezuelan economy became less diversified and even more dependent on oil revenue.46  
Venezuela’s main source of income, the state-owned oil company PDVSA, also suffered from 
mismanagement and neglect under Chávez.  Specifically, allocation of public spending in other 
areas of the economy have been blamed for the lack of investment in the maintenance or 
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improvement of company infrastructure and the exploration of potential new sources of 
revenue.47 
 In 2003, a debilitating PDVSA strike led by opposition leaders calling for Chávez’s 
resignation precipitated a drop of GDP of 27% and a run on Venezuela’s currency, the Bolivar, 
during the first four months of the year as oil production came to a halt.48  Measures taken 
following the strike to shore up the Bolivar created distortions that ultimately had long-lasting 
negative effects on the Venezuelan economy.  These included the introduction of a currency peg 
and the imposition of import controls.49  During the course of the strike, Chávez also fired and 
replaced almost half of PDVSA’s staff with loyalists, thus creating a brain drain and an 
important loss of human capital necessary for efficient company management.50   
 Chávez’s term as president was also characterized by growing political repression and 
authoritarianism.  Following an attempted coup in 2002, Chávez began taking measures to 
consolidate his power and repress opposition.  Constitutional amendments under Chávez 
expanded censorship and removed checks and balances in favor of the executive branch.  In 
2009, for example, presidential term limits were eliminated.51  State media was also given 
preferential treatment over private media companies, who were increasingly restricted by a 
judiciary composed of Chávez loyalists.52   
A 2008 Human Rights Watch report titled A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance 
and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela cited the regime’s 
discrimination against those with opposing political views and the actions taken to undermine the 
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independence of the judiciary branch.  The report also accused the Chávez regime of imposing 
“policies that have undercut journalists' freedom of expression, workers' freedom of association, 
and civil society's ability to promote human rights in Venezuela."53  Chávez was also routinely 
accused of fostering a culture of corruption that included nepotism and cronyism.54  
Thus, by the time of Chávez’s death in March 2013, the seeds for an economic collapse 
and political crisis had already been sewn.  The lack of economic diversification and a weakened 
private sector meant that the health of the economy was overly reliant on high oil prices to fund 
the government.  Budget deficits were high, and borrowing was contingent on future oil 
revenues.  Companies that had been expropriated and nationalized often became beacons of 
inefficiency.  The government’s cash cow PSDVA was already suffering from underinvestment 
and a shortage of skilled professionals, important factors affecting future output and profitability.  
Politically, Chávez had also begun taking steps towards authoritarianism by consolidating 
executive powers and repressing opposition.  Therefore, despite the meaningful reduction in 
inequality and poverty in Venezuela during Chávez’s 14-year rule as president, progress was 
made in the backdrop of poor long-term economic policies and political overreach.  Indeed, the 
stage was set for the economy to go up in flames, which is exactly what happened when the 
match was lit in 2014 with the fall of global oil prices.   
Economic collapse under Maduro (2014-today): 
  
 Following the death of Hugo Chávez, Nicolás Maduro was elected president of 
Venezuela in April 2013 after winning a close election against opposition candidate Henrique 
Capriles.  Maduro was Chávez’s hand-picked successor and vowed to continue Chávez’s 
economic policies and socialist initiatives in what Chávez coined the “Bolivarian Revolution.”  
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Unfortunately, the global price of oil suffered a sustained drop when it fell from $113 a barrel in 
June 2014.  In the period since the price of oil has not risen over $76 a barrel and at the time of 
the publication of this thesis stood at $55, 51% less than the price of oil in June 2014.55   
 Despite falling oil revenues, Maduro refused to change the government’s spending habits 
and proceeded to borrow more and expand the already large budget deficit to around 30% of 
GDP.56  Since international debt is paid off in dollars, problems ensued as depressed oil prices 
led to a scarcity of dollars and Venezuela was forced to tap into its dwindling foreign reserves to 
pay off creditors.  Since 2013, Venezuela’s foreign reserves are estimated to have dropped two 
thirds from $30 billion to $10 billion.57  Fearing being shut out of international credit markets 
and faced with dwindling amounts of dollars, the Maduro government was forced to cut imports 
in order to service debt.  The result was severe shortages and hunger among large portions of the 
population that depend on government food imports for survival.58  Unfortunately for Venezuela, 
the weakening of the domestic private sector during the Chávez years meant a greater 
dependency on imports for food, medicine, and other essentials.59  Making matter worse, food 
and product shortages began to stoke inflation.    
Finding these measures insufficient, the government began printing money to pay off 
international creditors, thus beginning a vicious cycle of rising inflation.60  This is because 
printing money leads to a devaluation of the local currency which in turn leads to a rise in prices 
as the value of each unit of local currency drops and imports become more expensive.  
Devaluation also means that each new round of debt requires that more money be printed than 
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the previous time to service equal amounts of international debt.  Doing so subsequently leads to 
further devaluation and ever greater inflation.  Such has been the case in Venezuela since 2013.     
Together shortages and printing money have led to levels of inflation in Venezuela 
comparable to Germany in the 1920s and Zimbabwe in 2008.61  Figures 2 and 3 below shows the 
sharp rise in inflation and the resulting devaluation in the Bolivar that have transpired since the 
end of Chávez’s presidency.  With hyperinflation having begun in October of 2017, it is 
estimated that in 2018 the inflation rate exceeded 1,300,000%.62  At this rate, a savings of USD 
$10,000 at the start of the year has a value of .59 by year’s end.  Nevertheless, despite still being 
astronomically high, the inflation rate is estimated to have fallen to around 445,000% as of July 
2019 due to a combination of increases in central bank reserve requirements and the economic 
certainty that hyperinflation tends to always “run out of steam.”63  
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It is an understatement to say that inflation at these levels has been catastrophic on the 
Venezuelan economy.  Since inflation makes imports more expensive, shortages have continued 
to rise which in turn has spurred even greater inflation.  In 2018, non-oil related imports were 
nearly 90% lower than in 2012.66  Inflation along with the government’s disregard for private 
property rights has also scared away foreign direct investment (FDI).  American FDI, for 
example, dropped from $600 billion in 2011 to virtually zero today.67  Inflation has also severely 
eaten into the wages of workers who find prices rising often on an hourly basis.  This has led 
most people in Venezuela to struggle paying for even the most essential of products.68   
Additionally, inflation has put a final blow on a private sector that was already put on the 
ropes during the Chávez years.  Wages eaten by inflation and emigration have depressed 
demand.  Meanwhile, government mandated price controls and minimum wage increases 
imposed to combat inflation have made being in business unprofitable.  Those who do not 
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comply are threatened with expropriation.  As a result, the private sector has seen numerous 
business closures and a rise in unemployment.  Not surprisingly, businesses that depend on 
imports have been hit especially hard by the spike in inflation.69   
Inflation has also rendered tax receipts worthless since their value is lost between the 
time they are solicited and collected.70  This is troubling for a government that to date has 
already defaulted on more than $11 billion of principal and interest bond debt and whose foreign 
debt of over $135 billion equals roughly five times its annual exports.71 Full default has only 
been avoided by mortgaging oil, gas, and gold fields mostly to Chinese and Russian state-
controlled firms.72  Currently over $13 billion is owed to China and $3 billion to Russia, amounts 
that are mostly being paid back in oil shipments.73   
 Yet even producing oil has also become more difficult as the main source of the 
government’s income, PDVSA, has fallen on hard times.  Oil output has plunged due to 
equipment or infrastructure being in disrepair, the firing or fleeing of skilled employees, and 
more recently, looting.74  As seen in Figure 4 below, oil production has fallen steadily since 2014 
to the lowest levels since the 1920s to around 1 million barrels a day, down 67% from about 3 
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Competent leadership at PDVSA has also been replaced by loyalists of the regime, often 
military officials, who are hired in exchange for their political support rather than based on their 
industry knowledge or capabilities.  In November 2017, Major-General Manuel Quevedo, who 
has no prior experience in the oil industry, was named president of the company.  Incidents of 
scavenging have also risen as employees and gangs thieve company equipment and machinery 
for survival.76  Given the current state of the company, it is unlikely therefore that Venezuela 
would even benefit much were there to be a sustained rebound in global oil prices.    
Moreover, the death of the private sector and drops in oil output and income have 
significantly damaged Venezuela’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP per person as seen 
below in Figures 5, 6, and 7.  In Figure 5, GDP in Venezuela is shown to have declined by over 
15% in each of the last three years.  As depicted in Figure 6, GDP is expected to shrink by an 
additional 22% to $76.46 billion in 2019, equating to a total drop in GDP of 64% since Maduro 
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first took office.  It is also seen in Figure 7 how GDP per person in Venezuela has fallen 
substantially below the regional average and is now approaching only $10,000, despite almost 
15% of the population having left the country since 2014.      







































77 “Venezuela: All You Need to Know about the Crisis in Nine Charts.” 





























































Maduro’s efforts to contain the economic crisis and revive the economy have been half-
hearted and ineffective.  The elimination of a currency peg and the introduction in August 2017 
of a new currency, the Sovereign Bolivar, as part of his “paquetazo rojo” or “big red package” 
have largely failed.  As it currently stands, the Sovereign Bolivar has lost 95% of its value 
against the dollar in its short lifetime.80   
It has already been mentioned how new price controls and rising minimum wages 
credulously meant to control inflation have been incredibly damaging on the livelihood of 
businesses.  However, minimum wage increases have also had a profoundly negative impact on 
professionals in Venezuela as compliance has meant financially strapped businesses and 
government institutions have had to reduce the salaries of higher-paid professionals.  Reports are 
that wage differentials have all but disappeared in Venezuela and that all workers are paid the 
minimum wage regardless of profession, experience, or education.  This has led to strikes from 
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teachers, doctors, and government workers who increasingly have found emigration to be the 
best recourse.81             
 American sanctions imposed on Venezuela with the intention of weakening the Maduro 
regime will only deepen the country’s economic demise.  In May 2018, the U.S. passed sanctions 
preventing Venezuela from selling debt in the U.S.82  In January 2019, following recognition of 
opposition leader Juan Guaidó’s government, the Trump administration passed additional 
sanctions placing American payments to PDVSA in escrow accounts that would only be made 
accessible following Guaidó’s transition to power.  Also included was a prohibition on American 
firms selling diluents to PDVSA, which are needed for the thick Venezuelan crude oil to pass 
through oil pipelines.83  The financial accounts of various high-ranking officials of the regime 
were also frozen and restrictions were placed on their travel to the U.S.84   
These sanctions were recently expanded in August of this year when President Trump 
signed an executive order freezing all Venezuelan government assets in the U.S. and prohibiting 
any U.S. firms from dealing with the Venezuelan government, thus essentially establishing an 
economic embargo against Venezuela.85  The effects of these sanctions will be serious and deep 
cutting since the U.S. hitherto was the largest consumer of Venezuelan oil, accounting for over 
40% of total Venezuelan crude oil exports as seen in Figure 8 below.  In response, Venezuela has 
had to sell much of its oil elsewhere, most notably India, but at lower margins due to higher 
transportation costs.86 In an economic crisis that seemingly could not get worse, Venezuela now 
risks reaching levels of destitution never seen in Latin America.    
 
81 Corina Pons and Mircely Guanipa, “‘We All Earn the Same’: Venezuela Minimum Wage Hike Angers Skilled 
Workers.” 
82 Garth Friesen, “The Path To Hyperinflation: What Happened To Venezuela?” 
83 “New Sanctions Are Placed on Venezuela’s Oil Company.” 
84 “After Repelling Aid Deliveries, Venezuela’s Despot Declares ‘Victory.’” 
85 Paul LeBlanc, “Trump Announces New Sanctions on Venezuelan Government.” 





   

















The human toll of the crisis: 
 
Not surprisingly. the human cost of the economic crisis has been high on what was once 
recognized as one of the wealthiest countries in Latin America.  Now the country with the 
world’s largest oil reserves struggles to provide enough food, medicine, and other essentials to 
maintain the livelihood of its people.  As seen in Figure 9 below, the poverty and extreme 
poverty rates in Venezuela have skyrocketed in the years following Chávez’s death to the point 
where over half of the population now finds itself in a state of extreme poverty.  
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Large drops in GDP have also coincided with alarmingly high rates of malnutrition as 
seen in Figure 10 below.  Since 2013, the rate of undernourishment in Venezuela has grown six-
fold from 6.4% to 21.2% of the population, meaning more than 1 in 5 Venezuelans are currently 
undernourished.89  87.5% of Venezuelan households now depend on government food rations, 
made available only by having a regime loyalty card.90  Dependency on these government 
handouts has only grown since Maduro began blocking much-needed foreign aid from entering 
the country in February of this year.91  Many Venezuelans now report having to stand in line 10 
hours per day for the scant amount of food that is available.92  In 2017, a consortium of 
Venezuelan universities released a study called Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (Encovi) citing 
that the average Venezuelan had lost over 25lbs since the start of the crisis and that nine out of 
ten people couldn’t afford the amount of food necessary for daily consumption.93  Figure 11 
shows how Venezuelans have had to change their consumption patterns in response to the crisis 
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Other statistics are indicative of the enormous toll the economic crisis has had on the 
Venezuelan people.  Lacking sufficient food and healthcare, the incidence of disease has risen 
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along with the under-five mortality rate.  Compounding the problem has been the high number of 
healthcare professionals that have left the country.96  Outbreaks in malaria, measles, diphtheria, 
and tuberculosis have been reported.97  Figure 12 shows the rising trajectory in the number of 
malaria cases recorded in Venezuela.  Figure 13 shows how the marked rise in the under-five 
mortality rate in Venezuela since 2012 contrasts with the gradual decline experienced by the rest 
of Latin America during the same period.   
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Blackout and water shortages have also become commonplace as the country struggles 
with decaying utility facilities and skilled employees fleeing the country.  Over half of the 
professionals employed at the state-run electrical monopoly, Corporlec, for example, have 
emigrated having earned salaries equivalent to just a few dollars a month.  In March, a 4-day 
countrywide blackout wreaked havoc on the country by not only keeping millions of citizens in 
the dark but also denying them access to clean drinking water.100  The constant failure of public 
transportation also drags down the national economy and makes life miserable for residents.101      
High crime has also been an expected result of the crisis as people succumb to illicit 
activities as a means of survival while at the same time the state struggles to provide resources to 
control such activity.  According to the Venezuelan Observatory of Violence (OVV), a nonprofit 
focused on tracking crime in Venezuela, the 2018 murder rate in Venezuela was 81.4 per 
100,000 people making it one of the highest murder rates globally.102  As a point of comparison, 
the murder rate in the United States was 5.3 per 100,000 people in 2017.103   The OVV report 
cites kidnappings, robberies, and car jackings as other commonly reported crimes that have made 
living in Venezuela very dangerous for many.  
Moving towards authoritarianism:  
  
As the economic crisis in Venezuela has intensified, so has the political one.  Since 
assuming power in 2014, Maduro has continued Chávez’s legacy of consolidating executive 
power and has even gone further in undermining democratic institutions and procedures in 
Venezuela.  In 2015, after the opposition won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, 
Maduro stacked the Supreme Court with loyalists who then proceeded to weaken the 
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opposition’s majority by preventing four newly elected lawmakers from being sworn into office.   
In July 2017, Maduro then staged what most consider to have been a sham election for a new 
“Constituent Assembly” loyal to him.  This new Constituent Assembly subsequently replaced the 
opposition-controlled National Assembly and stripped it of most of its powers and 
responsibilities.104  
The 2018 presidential election is the most recent and arguably the most glaring example 
of Maduro’s move towards authoritarianism that made the regime lose any remaining credibility 
or legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.  The election is highly regarded to have 
been rigged as opposition leaders were jailed, exiled, or intimidated.  Irregularities and voter 
intimidation were also reported on election day.105  Voter confidence in the fairness of the 
electoral system is so low that only 27% of registered voters participated in municipal elections 
in December.106     
Importantly, the results of the 2018 election united the opposition as well as mobilized 
the international community in a concerted effort to oust Maduro.  On January 23th, opposition 
leader Juan Guaidó was sworn in as Interim President of Venezuela by the National Assembly 
and recognition rapidly followed from the United States, Canada, most of Latin America, and the 
major democracies of Europe.  According to the national constitution, the National Assembly has 
the authority to elect an interim president in the event that the presidency becomes vacant.  The 
interim president will then remain in office until new, free elections can be held.  Due to the 
fraudulent nature of the presidential election, the opposition-controlled National Assembly 
proclaimed Maduro’s re-election as unlawful and the position of president vacant.107   
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Yet, Guaidó’s parallel government has hit many snags in the road in its attempts to 
overthrow the government.  Highly publicized efforts to get humanitarian aid past the border and 
into Venezuela have been successfully rebuked by Maduro’s security forces.108  On April 30th, a 
coup attempt beginning outside La Carlota airbase in eastern Caracas failed as key military and 
government officials stayed loyal to the Maduro regime, much to the chagrin of Guaidó and his 
followers.109  Demoralized, it remains to be seen what Guaidó’s next move will be and what 
effect increased U.S. sanctions will have on Maduro’s ability to maintain the loyal support of the 
armed forces.   
As Guaidó and the international community try to find ways to get Maduro to leave, 
Venezuela has increasingly become a mafioso state.  Corruption and criminality appear to be 
commonplace and as can be seen in Figure 14 below, Venezuela’s corruption index rating is 
significantly lower than the regional average.  To maintain the support of the armed forces, 
Maduro has given military officials privileged access to whatever remains of the country’s 
economic engines.  This includes the oil and gold industries as well as permission to oversee 
profitable illicit activities such as cocaine smuggling.110 They are also given cheap access to 
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Yet there is more than bribes and patronage keeping the armed forces loyal to Maduro.  
Experts suggest that many of the top military brass feel that their engagement in such high-level 
criminal activity has incriminated them forever and that Guaidó’s offer of amnesty will not apply 
to them in the event of Maduro’s departure.113  A legion of Cuban spies has also been integrated 
into the Venezuelan armed forces to report on dissent and ultimately help prevent any military-
style coup from occurring.  The Cuban presence has helped imprison dozens of high-ranking 
members of the armed forces on accusations of treason.114 
On July 5th, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights released a report written in 
part by former Chilean president Michelle Bachelet that cited numerous human rights violations 
on the part of the Maduro regime.  These included “violations of the right” to food and other 
essentials as well as various types of torture such as the use of electric shocks and waterboarding.  
The report also claimed that government security forces and paramilitary groups, such as the 
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feared “colectivos,” were responsible for the deaths of 6,800 people between January 2018 and 
May 2019.115  
Moreover, Maduro has also been connected to the ELN Colombian terrorist guerilla 
group, who is rumored to be helping the Venezuelan drug gang, Cartel de los Soles, establish 
drug-trafficking routes through Venezuela.  The Cartel de los Soles is said to be headed by high 
ranking officials of the Venezuelan military who in return for their political support have been 
given government consent to profit from the movement of drugs in Venezuela.  Maduro also 
reportedly allows the ELN to use Venezuelan borderlands as refuge from Colombian security 
forces and as zones from which to launch attacks.  Maduro’s relationship with the ELN is 
thought therefore to not only be facilitating drug-related activity in Venezuela but also acting as 
an impediment to the Colombian peace process.116      
Why people are leaving Venezuela  
 
Given the situation described, it is no surprise that an estimated 5,000 people leave 
Venezuela every day in what has become the largest displacement of people in Latin American 
history.117  As previously mentioned, the UN estimates that nearly four million Venezuelans will 
have left the beleaguered country by year’s end.118  As seen below in Figure 15, 50% of migrants 
surveyed in the Economic Integration Survey cited economic reasons as the principal motivation 
for leaving Venezuela, 26.98% cited insecurity from crime and/or violence, 9.35% cited political 
reasons, and 13.67% cited “other.”  Most of those who responded with “other” specified that 
there was no singular, principal reason for leaving but rather that the decision was made based on 
a combination of all the other answer choices.    
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Inseguridad derivada del delito y/o la violencia 26.98% 75



























When asked the open question of “Why did you leave Venezuela?” respondents painted a picture 
of the crisis that cannot be depicted by statistics and figures alone.  Some of the many responses 
include: 
¿Por qué se fue de Venezuela? 
“Crisis general. Falta de luz, agua, transporte, no me alcanzaba para las tres comidas, poca 
proteína, en fin por todo me fui de mi país.” 
 
“Falta de oportunidades de empleo. Crisis económica. Falta de matriales de construcción ... Falta 
de alimentos. Medicina.”  
 
“Escasez de alimentos, medicamentos y combustible, precario futuro para mi hijo.”  
 
“Por la situación país y demasiada delincuencia, no hay respeto a la propiedad privada, y no se 
puede avanzar en el país.” 
 
“Porque el sueldo no alcanza para comprar suficiente comida, hay mucha inseguridad, y todos 
los servicios publicos fallan. Se vive todo el dia angustiado porque no sabes si te robaran, o no 
comeras o te enfermas y no hay los medicamentos. Todo eso ha traido problemas psicológicos a 




“Falta de alimentos, falta de medicinas y reactivos para análisis de laboratorio, terrorismo en mi 
lugar de trabajo por parte del gobierno, sueldo indigno, delincuencia, insalubridad, falta de 
repuestos para vehículos, un caos en todos los aspectos, miedo por la terrible delincuencia” 
 
“Por la crisis social y económica en un régimen político narco comunista donde no existen entes 
gubernamentales autónomos. No hay respeto a la vida, al pensamiento libre. No hay 
meritocracia, no hay alimentos, ni medicamentos. Por último, no recibo los servicios básicos de 
agua, luz y gas en mi casa. El agua no llega por tuberías desde hace 5 años.”  
 
“El sueldo era insuficiente para vivir sumado a la inseguridad y la falta de todo, vi a mi madre 
perder 20 kilos en unos meses por que no teníamos que comer aunque las dos trabajábamos y 
somos profesionales”  
 
“Por la situación política, por ser contrario al Gobierno desde sus inicios y por haber sido 
descubierto como opositor, en un área donde se maneja la producción de manera remota y la 
información es confidencial, eso me conllevó a salir de la empresa por los ataques políticos y 
luego salir del país, por no tener como sustentar a mi familia.”  
 
“Por el cierre de mi empresa, nos quedamos sin papel para imprimir la revista” 
 
“Por la dictadura Madurita, escaces de alimentos, medicinas, médicos, por la cruel e imperante 
inseguridad desbordada por todo el país entre muchas otras adversidades más propias de dicha 
dictadura.” 
 
“Por que 2 de mis 3 hijos se vinieron a Argentina, mi hija fue abusada y salio en estado y mi 
esposo y yo vinimos atender a nuestra hija en su situación porque en Venezuela no existen 
condiciones ni garantías de salud tanto para la madre como para los bebes. Aunado a ello la 
situación de crisis de Venezuela falta de alimentos medicamentos falta de servicios básicos 
inseguridad. Mi esposo y yo de la tercera edad con condiciones de hipertensión y diabetes cada 
día se hacia mas difícil conseguir los medicamentos y cuando se conseguian eran incomparables, 
además la falta de transporte. Falta de efectivo para comprar ciertos rubros en fin un infierno.” 
 
Venezuelan emigration to Argentina in numbers 
 
To begin, Argentina is an attractive destination for migrants from Venezuela since both 
countries share the same language and similar cultural values as a result of an analogous colonial 
history.  This makes it easier for newcomers to assimilate both economically and socially than 
would be the case in other non-Spanish speaking countries such as Brazil, those in the Caribbean 
basin, and most countries outside of Latin America. Figure 16 below presents a map from the 
UN that estimates the migratory flow of Venezuelans to various countries over the last few years.  
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As can be seen, most Venezuelan migrants have relocated in Spanish-speaking countries in Latin 
America and Spain, which received an estimated 208,333 Venezuelan migrants in 2017.     
Compared to other Spanish-speaking countries, Argentina is an attractive destination for 
not only Venezuelan migrants, but people from many other countries as well.  This is because all 
foreigners, regardless of legal status, can take advantage of free public education through the 
university level as well as free public healthcare.  For Venezuelans, there are other incentives 
that make Argentina a particularly attractive destination.  One of which is the relative ease 
involved with entering Argentina legally and obtaining residency and work permits.   
In light of the current humanitarian crisis, the migratory privileges granted to fellow 
Mercosur members have been upheld for Venezuelans entering the country despite Venezuela’s 
suspension from the regional trade block in December 2016.  As such, Venezuelans entering 
Argentina do not need a passport and can provide any form of government-issued 
identification.119  In an interview with the press director for the DNM, Hugo Moujan120, it was 
also learned that given the current challenges associated with obtaining and renewing 
documentation in Venezuela, Argentina has also made the decision to accept expired documents 
from Venezuela and permit children under the age of nine to legally enter with only a birth 
certificate.121 
The relaxation of rules for Venezuelan migrants trying to enter Argentina stands in 
contrast to the positions taken by other countries in the region overwhelmed by the sudden 
inflow of people.  Peru, Chile, and Ecuador have over the last year begun requiring that migrants 
obtain visas before being permitted to enter their countries.  Unfortunately for migrants, 
obtaining a visa in these countries requires documentation that is not readily available in 
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Venezuela such as passports and criminal records.  The process can also be time consuming and, 
in the case of Chile, include fees that many migrants are unable to afford.122  Faced with stricter 
immigration policies elsewhere, it is therefore expected that more migrants may gravitate 
towards Argentina as the crisis continues.   





























Also seen in Figure 16 above is that most Venezuelan migrants who have stayed in Latin 
America have up to this point gone primarily to Colombia, Peru and Ecuador.  As previously 
mentioned, greater restrictions for entering Peru and Ecuador will likely shift some of this 
migratory flow to Argentina, which has remained committed to keeping a relatively open 
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immigration policy for Venezuelans.  It should be noted that the UN figure of 95,000 migrants to 
Argentina in 2018 in the graphic was overestimated as the actual figure was 70,531 according to 
the DNM.124    
Moreover, Figures 17 and 18 below include data from the DNM and show the number of 
Venezuelan migrants that have relocated in Argentina over the last several years.  As is expected, 
the numbers have rapidly increased since 2014.  Between 2017 and 2018 alone there was a 126% 
increase in Venezuelans residing in Argentina, following a previous increase of 142% between 
2016 and 2017.  In 2018, 70,532 Venezuelans relocated in Argentina, adding to a total of 
127,152 migrants that have moved to Argentina since 2012.  The upward trend in Venezuelan 
migration appears to be continuing in 2019, with 41,932 migrants having relocated to Argentina 
just within the first four months of the year according to the DNM.125    
 


























Radicaciones resueltas - Nacionalidad venezolana 
Categoría 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TOTAL 
Temporarias 1,130 1,290 1,772 4,698 11,298 27,075 60,687 107,950 
Permanentes 777 988 854 1,086 1,561 4,092 9,844 19,202 
TOTAL 
ANUAL 
1,907 2,278 2,626 5,784 12,859 31,167 70,531 127,152 
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Figure 19 below shows the number of Venezuelans relocating in Argentina each year 
compared to other immigrant populations in Argentina.  As can be seen, in 2018 Venezuelans 
ranked number one by accounting for 31.8% of all total new immigrants.  This is a major change 
from just two years earlier in 2016 when Venezuelans only accounted for 6% of all new 
immigrants and ranked fifth after Paraguayans, Bolivians, Peruvians, and Colombians. 
 










































Facilidad de ingreso y trabajo legal en Argentina 70.50% 196
Mejores oportunidades de trabajo 30.94% 86
Para estar cerca de familiares o amigos que ya viven en Argentina 29.50% 82
Acceso a la educación universitaria gratuita y pública 31.29% 87
Acceso a servicios públicos gratuitos, financiados por el gobierno más allá de la educación (por ejemplo, atención médica) 14.39% 40
El idioma compartido y los valores culturales similares 39.57% 110
Other (please specify) 14.75% 41
Answered 278
Responses
Motivations for emigrating to Argentina 
 
In order to obtain a more nuanced understanding of migrants’ motivations to move to 
Argentina, survey respondents for the Economic Integration Survey were asked to check all the 
reasons why they decided to emigrate to Argentina, as opposed to another country.  The results 
are shown below in Figure 20:  























As can be seen, the ease of entering & working legally in Argentina was an important 
consideration with 70.50% of migrants citing it as one of the reasons they decided to go to 
Argentina.  Other leading factors included a shared language and similar cultural values 
(39.57%), access to free public university education (31.29%), and better job opportunities 
(30.94%).  Many respondents who selected “Other” cited low levels of xenophobia and 
discrimination towards Venezuelans as a reason for emigrating to Argentina.   
Respondents were then asked to rank all the reasons for moving to Argentina that they 
had previously selected in terms of importance.  A weighted average system was used to 
calculate the results with higher ranking answers (ex. primary or secondary motivations) getting 
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a higher weight attributed to them than lower ranking answers.  The results are seen below in 






























With the highest weighted average of 6.60, the majority of those who had selected “ease 
of entering & working legally in Argentina” as a motivation to move to Argentina considered it 
to be one of the most, if not the most, important factor in deciding to move to Argentina.  Indeed, 
70.92% ranked it as the most important factor while 19.90% ranked it as the second most 
important factor.  “Being close to family or friends already living in Argentina” also ranked 
highly with a score of 6.29 and is also likely to increase in frequency as a motivation for moving 
to Argentina as chain migration to Argentina likely increases.   
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 “Better job opportunities” was not a leading motivation for many respondents with a 
score of only 5.76 and with only 19.77% of those who listed it as a motivation for coming to 
Argentina considering it their most important one.  Although many people (39.57%) had chosen 
“a shared language and similar cultural values” as one of their reasons for moving to Argentina 
in Figure 20, the results in Figure 21 show that it was relatively unimportant as it had the second 
lowest score of 5.15 among all choices.  “Access to free, government-funded public services 
other than education” was both the least cited reason for migrating to Argentina with only 40 
responses and one of the least important ones among those who did cite it with a score of only 
4.72.   
The geographic dispersion of migrants in Argentina 
 
This data below in Figure 22 from the DNM shows by province where in Argentina 
Venezuelan migrants are residing in the period 2012-2018.  As can be seen, most Venezuelan 
migrants to Argentina have decided to reside in the capital city of Buenos Aires (CABA).  
Overall, more than 91% of Venezuelan migrants live either in CABA or in the province of 
Buenos Aires.  The province of Córdoba, home to Argentina’s second largest city, is a distant 
third with 3.21% of the Venezuelan migrant population.  Not surprisingly, there are noticeable 
numbers of Venezuelan migrants living in Neuquén and Río Negro, the epicenters of Argentina’s 
current oil and gas exploration projects.  As will be explored in greater detail, this is due to the 
large numbers of petroleum and industrial engineers that have migrated to Argentina from 






PROVINCIA 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total general % of Total
BUENOS AIRES 299 387 352 706 1,678 4,884 17,937 26,243 20.64%
CATAMARCA 4 1 2 16 18 41 0.03%
CHACO 4 6 10 10 16 49 95 0.07%
CHUBUT 8 10 11 14 49 111 305 508 0.40%
CABA 1,325 1,630 1,893 4,523 10,327 24,210 45,662 89,570 70.44%
CORDOBA 65 62 116 172 354 739 2,577 4,085 3.21%
CORRIENTES 2 2 4 4 6 17 43 78 0.06%
ENTRE RIOS 36 15 28 20 39 32 98 268 0.21%
FORMOSA 2 3 5 0.00%
JUJUY 4 1 5 8 4 42 57 121 0.10%
LA PAMPA 5 5 1 1 5 37 304 358 0.28%
LA RIOJA 1 1 2 2 10 21 37 0.03%
MENDOZA 27 38 23 67 56 144 411 766 0.60%
MISIONES 1 3 4 6 9 35 71 129 0.10%
NEUQUEN 19 25 48 94 116 227 1,025 1554 1.22%
RIO NEGRO 14 25 22 34 45 131 319 590 0.46%
SALTA 3 7 5 17 10 48 133 223 0.18%
SAN JUAN 10 5 8 4 14 74 156 271 0.21%
SAN LUIS 14 3 7 5 15 44 123 211 0.17%
SANTA CRUZ 1 4 3 3 13 44 77 145 0.11%
SANTA FE 56 32 76 72 58 212 691 1197 0.94%
SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO 1 4 2 10 7 84 108 0.08%
TIERRA DEL FUEGO 3 5 6 10 17 31 54 126 0.10%
TUCUMAN 8 11 6 9 20 56 313 423 0.33%
Total general 1,907 2,278 2,626 5,784 12,859 31,167 70,531 127,152 100.00%
VENEZOLANOS - RADICACIONES RESUELTAS POR PROVINCIA 
Figure 22129  
 
























As seen below in Figure 23, most respondents to the Economic Integration Survey, 
74.46%, reside in Greater Buenos Aires.  Greater Buenos Aires, as defined by the Argentine 
National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), includes the autonomous city of Buenos 
Aires (CABA) and 24 adjacent districts that are located in the province of Buenos Aires.  Unlike 
in the DNM statistics in Figure 22, I decided to group migrants living in the 24 adjacent districts 
with those living in CABA into the singular category of Greater Buenos Aires.  The DNM, on 
the other hand, includes migrants living in the 24 adjacent districts under the category of Buenos 
Aires province.  The decision was made in order to more accurately represent the number of 
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migrants living in the economic, social, and political nucleus that is the capital region versus 
those living farther away in other more distant areas of the province.   
Moreover, the provinces of Buenos Aires and Córdoba are home to the second and third 
most survey respondents with 9.35% and 4.32% of the total respectively.  Overall, 83.81% of 
Venezuelan migrants from the Economic Integration Survey live in Greater Buenos Aires or the 
province of Buenos Aires.  Like the DNM data, there is also a notable population of respondents 
living in Neuquén and Río Negro, accounting for 3.96% and 1.44% of the total respectively.   
Figure 23  
Geographic Dispersion of Economic Integration Survey Respondents 
 
 
Buenos Aires neighborhood dispersion among survey respondents 
 
The Economic Integration Survey also solicited data regarding the neighborhoods where 
Venezuelan migrants are living in each city.  The data for neighborhood selection was analyzed 
for Greater Buenos Aires, since this is the urban enclave with the most Venezuelan migrants.  
After review, there was no discernible pattern or concentration of migrants in any particular 
neighborhood or district of Greater Buenos Aires.  This finding was validated in my interview 
with Vincenzo Pensa, who as president of the oldest and one of the largest Venezuelan 
Province Respondents Percentage (%) 
Greater Buenos Aires 207 74.46 
Buenos Aires (province) 26 9.35 
Chabut 1 .36 
Córdoba 12 4.32 
Entre Ríos 6 2.16 
Mendoza 1 .36 
Neuquén 11 3.96 
Río Negro 4 1.44 
Salta 6 2.16 
San Luis 1 .36 
Santa Cruz 1 .36 
Santa Fe 2 .72 
Total 278 100.00 
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community outreach organizations in Buenos Aires, ASOVEN130, is very familiar with local 
Venezuelan migrants’ living patterns.  He jokingly remarked that there is no “little Venezuela” in 
Buenos Aires and that this is a good thing since too many Venezuelans together in one area 
would create “chaos.”131     





























130 ASOVEN was created in 1998 in Buenos Aires by a group of Venezuelans living in Argentina together with 
Argentines with strong ties to Venezuela.  ASOVEN is dedicated to creating a united community of Venezuelans living 
in Argentina, preserving Venezuelan history and cultural traditions, and promoting charity events for needy 
Venezuelans both in Argentina and Venezuela.  ASOVEN also works closely with the Argentine government in helping 
new migrants assimilate to Argentine society. 



















Chapter III: Demographic and Socioeconomic Profiles of Economic 






























 This chapter develops a demographic and socioeconomic profile for the respondents to 
the Economic Integration Survey.  Responses to survey questions included in this section provide 
important information regarding the backgrounds of migrants and are used to determine if there 
are noticeable trends among the sample population.  The areas examined are respondents’ 
gender, age, arrival date in Argentina, educational level and background, and socioeconomic 
























Overall, there was a relatively equal balance of responses between the genders. However, 
slightly more women responded to the survey than men with 52.6% of respondents being women 











































Most respondents are of young, working age with 73.02% being between the ages 25-44.  
The biggest age group is the 25-34 range, accounting for 45.68% of the total.  The 55-64 age 
group only accounts for 7.19% of the total while no respondents reported being over the age of 
65.  Those between 18-24 only represent 7.55% of all respondents. This age distribution is a 
positive for the Argentine government since most migrants are of working age and able to 
contribute economically while also being less likely because of their age to depend on free 







Hace menos de 1 año 32.37% 90
Hace 1-2 años 39.57% 110
Hace 2-3 años 12.95% 36
Hace 3-4 años 6.12% 17
Hace 4-5 años 4.68% 13
Hace 5-10 años 3.60% 10
Hace más de 10 años 0.72% 2
Answered 278
Responses































Most respondents (71.94%) arrived within the last two years.  This is expected, 
considering that the number of arrivals to Argentina has increased over the last five years as the 










No completé la escuela secundaria 0.36% 1
Actualmente en la escuela secundaria 0.36% 1
Graduado de la escuela secundaria 2.52% 7
Actualmente en una escuela técnica/de oficios 1.08% 3
Graduado de una escuela técnica/de oficios 4.32% 12
Actualmente en la universidad 6.47% 18
Graduado de la universidad 60.43% 168
Actualmente con un posgrado en curso 6.83% 19




































The majority of respondents (78.06%) have a bachelor’s degree or higher.  An additional 
6.47% of respondents are currently in college.  As a point of comparison, only 19% of 
Argentines are estimated by the OECD to have graduated with a university degree.132 
Additionally, a high percentage of respondents, 17.63%, also have a postgraduate degree.  As a 
collective group, Venezuelan migrants to Argentina can therefore be considered highly educated.   
 
 
132 OECD, Education at a Glance 2017, 51. 
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Radicaciones resueltas venezolanos     
Selección x actividad - 2015 a 2018 























Admin. de empresas, empresario, contador 10.860 













Base Aplicativo SAdEx DNM - Ministerio del Interior 
 
Answer Choices
Medicina y Salud 21.26% 54
Ingeniería Industrial 7.48% 19
Ingeniería Petrolera 5.91% 15
Ingeniería Civil 5.51% 14
Ingeniería Mecánica 5.51% 14
Derecho y Criminología 4.72% 12
Administración de Empresas 4.33% 11
Ingeniería Electrónica 4.33% 11
Comunicación, Imagen y Sonido 3.94% 10
Educación y Pedagogía 3.15% 8
Otra (especifique) 3.15% 8
Ingeniería Química 2.76% 7
Medicina y Salud (no médico) 2.76% 7
Responses





















The engineering and medical fields are the most represented among all respondents, 
accounting for 40.93% and 24.02 of the total respectively.  Among engineers, industrial 
engineering and petroleum engineers are the most common specializations.  These findings 
support data from the DNM in Figure 29 that show engineers and medical professionals 




















Clase alta 1.08% 3
Clase media alta 22.66% 63
Clase media 60.79% 169
Clase media baja 14.75% 41
Clase baja 0.72% 2
Answered 278
Responses


























Back in Venezuela, most respondents considered themselves part of the middle or upper-
middle classes (83.45%).  This makes sense given most respondents have a university education 
and there is usually a strong correlation between education and social class.    
Findings compared to other studies 
 
 The demographic and socioeconomic data collected on Venezuelan migrants in the 
Economic Integration Survey support the data collected by the previously mentioned studies 
performed by Aruj and the IOM.  As in these studies, it was found that most migrants to 
Argentina are young, well-educated professionals from middle class and upper-middle class 
backgrounds.  Also like these other studies, relatively equal numbers of men and women and 
high numbers of Venezuelan medical professionals and engineers were reported.  In general, it 
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has been found that Venezuelan migrants to Argentina are relatively more affluent and more 
educated than those that have relocated in other countries in closer proximity to Venezuela.   
  Although it should be noted that according to Hugo Moujan, the makeup of Venezuelan 
migrants to Argentina is beginning to change as more migrants with less resources and education 
arrive by less expensive land routes rather than by air.  He estimates that what used to be a 
distribution of about 90% of arrivals by air and 10% of arrivals by land has now shifted to 70% 
and 30% respectively.  This trend is likely to continue as less skilled and less affluent 
Venezuelan migrants previously living in countries closer to Venezuela migrate south towards 







































































Soy Ciudadano Naturalizado 2.16% 6
Tengo Residencia Permanente 23.02% 64
Tengo Residencia Temporaria 59.71% 166
Tengo Certificado de Residencia Precaria 4.32% 12
Solo tengo pasaporte venezolano pero YA comencé los tramites para la residencia 7.55% 21
Solo tengo pasaporte venezolano y aunque no he comezado todavía, PLANEO hacer los tramites para la residencia pronto 1.80% 5
Solo tengo pasaporte venezolano y NO PLANEO hacer los tramites para la residencia 0.00% 0
Prefiero no decir 1.44% 4
Answered 278
Responses
This chapter looks in depth at the current economic situation of Venezuelan migrants in 
Argentina based on responses to the Economic Integration Survey.  Firstly, respondents’ legal 
statuses are examined and the implications they have on employment prospects.  This is followed 
by a discussion on the current employment situation and employment rates of respondents.  The 
number of respondents working in the formal or informal sectors is also explored along with the 
primary methods that are used by migrants to search for employment in Argentina.  Finally, data 
is presented regarding the average monthly income of respondents, the degree to which migrants 
benefit from different types of direct government financial assistance, and levels of 
































Desempleado pero buscando trabajo en forma activa 35.25% 98
Económicamente inactivo (es decir, que no sea empleado ni esté buscando trabajo)2.16% 6
Answered 278
Responses
Most respondents (89.21%) are either legal residents or citizens of Argentina.  A majority 
of this subset (66.94%) have temporary residency that is valid for two years and eligible for 
renewal.  Importantly, since residency offers the legal opportunity to work, this data shows that a 
high percentage of Venezuelans are therefore eligible to be employed by the formal sector.  A 

























The unemployment rate among respondents is 36.03%.  This rate is high considering that 
the unemployment rate in Argentina is only around 10%.  It should be noted that the 
unemployment rate for respondents may be inflated since a high percentage of respondents 
(32.37%) only just arrived in Argentina less than one year before. New arrivals often need time 
to adjust to the labor market and find employment.  Excluding respondents who arrived one year 
prior or before, the unemployment rate drops to 23.50%.  However, this figure is still high 




Soy estudiante de tiempo completo 33.33% 2
Soy jubilado 0.00% 0
Soy discapacitado 0.00% 0
Soy responsable del cuidado de un niño o un padre 16.67% 1
No pude encontrar un trabajo y ahora he dejado de buscar 0.00% 0
Other (please specify) 50.00% 3
Answered 6
Responses
economically inactive which makes sense given most are of working age and came to Argentina 
for better economic opportunities.           





























Of the six respondents who are economically inactive, two are full-time students and one 
is responsible for taking care of a child or parent.  Those who responded as “other” were a 








Trabajo en un marco de economía formal ("en blanco") 75.86% 132
Trabajo en un marco de economía informal ("en negro") 14.37% 25
Tengo varios trabajos que son una mezcla de economías formales e informales9.77% 17
Answered 174
Responses

























Of the respondents that are employed, most (75,86%) reported that they work in the 
formal economy.  On the other hand, 14.37% of employed respondents work in the informal 
economy and 9.77% have jobs both in the formal and informal economies.  Overall in Argentina, 
over 35% of the employed population is estimated to work in the informal economy.133  The 
relatively low percentage of respondents working in the informal economy may be due to the 
fact that many Venezuelan migrants are professionals.  Even so, the informality rate among 
respondents would likely be lower if it were not for underemployment.   
Employment search process 
 
Employed respondents were asked an open question regarding how they found their 
current job(s). The most frequent answer was through personal contacts or relationships.  The 
 





ARS $0-$15,000 15.52% 27
ARS $15,001-$20,000 11.49% 20
ARS $20,001-$25,000 16.67% 29
ARS $25,001-$35,000 16.67% 29
ARS $35,001-$50,000 14.37% 25
ARS $50,001-$70,000 10.92% 19
ARS $70,001-$100,000 10.34% 18
ARS $100,001- $150,000 3.45% 6
Más de ARS $150,000 0.57% 1
Answered 174
Responses
second most common response was through online job search sites such as Bumeran, 
Computrabajo, Indeed, or Zonajob.  After personal contacts and online job search sites, the most 
common methods of finding work were through social media sites such as LinkedIn, Instagram, 
or Facebook and by personally reaching out to employers.  Multiple respondents also found their 
current job(s) through traditional job agencies or headhunters, classified ads in newspapers, 
professional associations such as IngVenAr or Asomevenar, and physical ads posted outside of 
local businesses.  Other answers, although less common, included people who were transferred 
to Argentina by the same company that they were working for in Venezuela and people who 
started their own businesses.     































Gross monthly income among employed respondents is relatively well distributed among 
income brackets below ARS $100,001-$150,000 (~USD $1,700-$2,575).  Overall, 47.71% of 
respondents earn between ARS $20,001-$50,000 (~USD $345-$860) per month.  Notably, there 
is also a spike in respondents (15.52%) that have very low monthly incomes of between ARS $0-
$15,000 (~USD $0-$26).  According to INDEC, the average monthly income for men in 
Argentina during the first quarter of 2019 was ARS $23,128 and for women was ARS 
$17,041.134   
Since exact income figures from respondents were not collected, the mean average of 
respondents’ monthly incomes was calculated using the middle value of each income bracket.  
For the highest income bracket with no upper limit, the figure of ARS $150,000 was used in the 
calculation.   In the end, the mean average income of respondents was calculated to be ARS 
$37,830 per month, higher than both the average monthly incomes of both employed men and 
women in Argentina.  Again, this is probably attributed to the fact that such a high proportion of 
Venezuelans are professionals.  However, this figure is still lower than the average monthly 
income for professionals in Argentina during the first quarter of 2019 of ARS $41,594 according 
to INDEC.135  This difference in earnings may partially be attributed to the underemployment of 





   
 





No envío remesas 17.24% 30






































The largest percentage of employed respondents (32.76%) send remittances abroad 
equivalent to 6-10% of their monthly income.  The second largest percentage of employed 















Subsidio por Desempleo 0.00% 0
Jubilacion/ Pensión para Adultos Mayores 0.00% 0
Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH) 100.00% 7
Other (please specify) 0.00% 0
Answered 7
Responses



















































As seen above in Figure 37, the great majority of respondents (97.48%) do not receive 
any type of direct financial assistance from the Argentine government.  As seen in Figure 38, all 
those who do receive financial assistance do so through the government program Asignación de 
Hijo (AUH), which provides financial support to families with children.  According to Mari 
Quarteroni, a consultant at the Ministry of Economic Affairs for the Province of Buenos Aires, 
AUH is the most popular financial assistance program in Argentina.  On the contrary, 
Quarternoni explains that unemployment financial support from the government is not common 
in Argentina since in order to be eligible the individual needs to have worked in the formal 
economy, be fired without just cause, and be more than 35 years old.  Moreover, unemployment 
payments from the Argentine government are limited to a maximum of 12 months.136 
Respondents receiving financial assistance from AUH claim to collect between ARS $1500-
$2800 (~USD $25-$47) per month from the government.    
Discrimination 
 
Results suggest that discrimination towards Venezuelan migrants from Argentines is 
relatively low.  In Figure 39 below, respondents gave an average discrimination score of 2.05 out 
of 10, with 0 being no perceived discrimination and 10 being high levels of perceived 
discrimination.  As seen in Figure 40, 68.35% of respondents responded as having experienced 
no discrimination in the workplace or in the hiring process for being Venezuelan.  A lesser but 
still significant number of respondents (23.02%) cited having felt being discriminated against in 
the employment or hiring process for being Venezuelan.  In general, there seems to be a direct 
relationship between low levels of discrimination felt by Venezuelan migrants in Argentina and 
the lack of a strong backlash from natives such as has occurred in other countries in the region in 
 










No tengo experiencia en la solicitud de trabajo 8.63% 24
Answered 278
Responses
response to the sudden inflow of large numbers of Venezuelan migrants.  A more detailed 




















































































This chapter looks exclusively at the underemployment of Venezuelan migrants in 
Argentina.  Data from the Economic Integration Survey and insight obtained through interviews 
are used to determine the scope of underemployment among members of the Venezuelan 
community in Argentina.  Using ILO guidelines, underemployment is measured for the entire 
population of survey respondents and more specifically for two of the largest groups of 
Venezuelan professionals in Argentina, engineers and doctors.  The causes of underemployment 
are then described in general terms for the entire population and outlined more specifically in the 
cases of Venezuelan engineers and doctors.     
A discussion on actions that the Argentine government has already taken to help reduce 
Venezuelan underemployment then follows.  These include changes in the degree accreditation 
and residency application processes and the development of a new digital employment search 
platform.  Commentary and suggestions to the Argentine government about ways to reduce 
underemployment among Venezuelans in Argentina from underemployed migrants themselves 
are also included.  Finally, the important role played by organized members of the Venezuelan 
community in Argentina in helping reduce migrant underemployment and make the relocation 
and assimilation processes in Argentina easier for new arrivals is highlighted.   
Underemployment methodology 
 
As previously mentioned, the methodology used to measure underemployment will be 
based on the guidelines set forth by the ILO.  For measuring time-related underemployment, the 
ILO suggests using a national standard for determining how many hours per a reference period is 
considered “full time.”  For the Economic Integration Survey, it was decided to use the standard 
employed by INDEC which defines “full time” in Argentina as working 35 hours or more per 
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week after accounting for all of one’s various jobs.137  Those who work less than 35 hours per 
week are therefore defined as working “part-time.”  Using these guidelines, an individual is 
considered time-based underemployed in the Economic Integration Survey if they responded as 
1.) working less than 35 hours per week after accounting for all their jobs AND 2.) willing and 
capable of working more hours per week.   
Skills-related underemployment was also measured using guidelines set forth by the ILO.  
After a series of questions, respondents were determined to be skills-related underemployed if 
they 1.) did not feel that their current primary job in Argentina utilized their education, 
professional experiences, and/or skills AND 2.) were willing and able to take on another job that 
better utilized their education, professional experience, and/or skills.  As mentioned earlier, the 
two forms of underemployment are not mutually exclusive which means that respondents can be 
both time and skills-related underemployed.  Finally, it should also be noted that 
underemployment is self-assessed by workers and therefore its measurement is subjective despite 
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Total employed population: 174 
Total underemployed: 90 
% underemployed: 51.72% 
 
As seen above in Figure 41, the percentage of all Venezuelan migrants surveyed that are 
underemployed in one form or another is high at 51.72%.  Furthermore, most of the 
underemployed population (80%) is only skills-related underemployed.  Those that are only 
time-related underemployed or both time and skill-related underemployed represent 11.11% and 
8.89% of the total underemployed population respectively.  These numbers suggest that skills-
related underemployment is a much bigger problem among Venezuelan migrants than time-
related underemployment.   
Conclusions that can be made are that most migrants (89.66%) who are employed are 
thus working full-time or are working part-time and do not have the ability or desire to work full-
time.  However, 46.51% of the employed population report that their primary job does not utilize 
their skills, education, or professional experience and that they would like another job that does 
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utilize these competencies.  Based on these statistics, reducing skill-related underemployment 
among Venezuelan migrants should therefore be a priority for policymakers when addressing the 
issue of underemployment.   
Causes of underemployment among Venezuelan migrants 
 
The causes of underemployment of Venezuelan migrants differ depending on profession.  
However, in Argentina they are usually one or a combination of certain factors.  One of these is 
the poor state of the Argentine economy.  Argentina is suffering from an economic recession 
with GDP dropping 1.77% over the last year and inflation hovering at 54%.138  The 
unemployment rate also increased over the last year from 9.6% to 10.6%.139  Under these 
conditions, it is often difficult for both immigrants and Argentines alike to find satisfying work.   
An interview with Dr. Gabriela Sala, a demographer and researcher at the National 
Research Council of Argentina (CONICET), provided additional insight on the issue of 
underemployment, which she claims in mostly macro-economic in nature.  According to Sala, 
“underemployment is a serious problem faced not only by immigrants but also Argentines given 
the current economic conditions.”  Sala also claims that underemployment in Argentina has 
resulted from the inability of the job market to keep pace with the education of the populace.  
She says that over the last few decades Argentines have become increasingly more educated as 
more young people go to university.   However, according to her, new jobs requiring this level of 
education have been slow to emerge, forcing graduates to accept jobs that are below their 
education level.  Sala notes that this is a problem not only in Argentina, but in all Latin America.   
A second factor in creating underemployment involves the difficulty and time associated 
with getting one’s degree accredited in Argentina.  Before being able to practice professionally, 
 
138 “Argentina - Consumer Price Index (CPI).” 
139 “Argentina - Unemployment Rate.” 
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many Venezuelan migrants must get their degrees accredited by the Argentine authorities.  While 
this process has been expedited recently for Venezuelan migrants, it can still take more than a 
year to complete.  In the meantime, many migrants find themselves in a state of 
underemployment and working in jobs that pay significantly less than others commensurate with 
their qualifications. 
A third factor associated with underemployment involves unfamiliarity with how the job 
market works in Argentina.  This includes not understanding how or where to find job 
opportunities.  As with the poor Argentine economy, this factor can affect natives as well as 
immigrants if there is poor communication between those supplying jobs and those looking for 
jobs.  This factor becomes particularly significant if there are job opportunities in certain areas of 
the country that are not promoted to qualified workers from other areas. 
 As seen in Figure 42 below, those considered underemployed in the Economic 
Integration Survey were asked the question, “What do you believe are the reasons you are 
underemployed in Argentina?” and to check all applicable responses.  The most common 
response, constituting 43.33% of the total, involved the inability or difficulty associated with the 
accreditation of degrees, licenses, or certifications from Venezuela in Argentina.  The second 
most common response was a poor Argentine economy and the current lack of jobs in their 
professional area.  The two least cited responses were discrimination against foreign workers and 
little or no demand for their professional expertise or skills in Argentina, even in a good 
economy.  “Other” responses were varied and attributed underemployment to discrimination, a 










La economía pobre y la actual falta de empleo en Argentina en mi área de especialización 23.33% 21
La poca o nula demanda de mi experiencia o habilidades profesionales en Argentina (incluso en una buena economía) 11.11% 10
La discriminación contra trabajadores extranjeros 7.78% 7
La incapacidad o dificultad para validar los títulos, licencias o certificaciones de Venezuela en Argentina 43.33% 39
La competencia laboral excesiva de otras personas con calificaciones similares en mi profesión 17.78% 16
La falta de conocimiento sobre las oportunidades de trabajo disponibles 21.11% 19





























Where Venezuelan migrants work while underemployed 
 
Figure 43 on the next page presents a chart that shows the education and employment 
details of all those who consider themselves underemployed in the Economic Integration Survey 
in one form or another.  Unfortunately, the data could not be isolated to include only those who 
experience skills-related underemployment.  Listed are respondents’ education levels, area of 
educations, primary occupation in Venezuela, and current occupation(s) in Argentina.  Upon 
analysis, there are many clear cases of underemployment.  The data show many educated 
professionals working in their field of expertise or a related field, but in a lower-level position.  
Examples include medical doctors working as laser-hair removal specialists, caretakers assisting 
the sick or elderly, or pharmaceutical employees.  Other professionals are working in lower-level 
positions in fields completely unrelated to their education or previous work experience.  
90 
 
Common examples include engineers working as waiters, retail vendors, cleaning personnel, 
cooks, delivery people, store clerks, or call center employees.   
In a conversation with a Buenos Aires-based human resources manager at PedidosYa, 
one of the largest online food delivery companies in Latin America, it was explained that around 
14% of all the “cadetes” that work directly for the company in Buenos Aires are Venezuelan.  
Cadetes are the food delivery people and personal shoppers who perform deliveries door-to-door 
on bicycle or motorcycle.  Specifically, he says 124 of the 839 cadetes working for PedidosYa in 
Buenos Aires are from Venezuela.  If independent contract workers are included, he estimates 
that the percentage of Venezuelans working as cadetes for the company in Buenos Aires is closer 
to 25%.    
 Sala, who has performed research on various immigrant communities in Argentina, says 
that it is common to see educated Venezuelans working in little shops in barrio once in Buenos 
Aires, a neighborhood with a historical reputation for small, often informal, immigrant-owned 
businesses.  She also says that Venezuelans in particular are active in the food industry typically 
working as waiters, cooks, or delivery people.  Unfortunately, she says that these high-turnover 
businesses often exploit vulnerable immigrant workers such as Venezuelans.  Interestingly, she 
notes that some Venezuelans in Argentina have also started businesses out of their own houses as 











Nivel de educación Campo de educacion Ocupación en Venezuela Ocupación(es) actual en Argentina
Response Response Open-Ended Response Open-Ended Response
Graduado de posgrado Educación y Pedagogía Profesor de Matematica Ayudante de Carnicería
Graduado de la universidad Educación y Pedagogía Investigador  docente Community manager
Graduado de una escuela técnica/de oficios Asistente Call Center
Graduado de posgrado Biología, Bioquímica y Biotecnología Biólogo Ventas en una Pyme
Actualmente con un posgrado en curso Economía Economista, semi senior. Consultor financiero junior
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud Medico Cuidador
Actualmente en la universidad Marketing y Comercio Estudiante universitaria Servir en un heladeria
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud Médico Operador telefónico
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud MEDICO GENERAL RECEPCIONISTA / MEDICO
Graduado de posgrado Medicina y Salud Oftalmólogo Técnico óptico
Graduado de posgrado Medicina y Salud Cirujano General Médico general, cirujano general
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud Ejercicio de la medicina Depilacion laser en un centro de medicina estetica
Graduado de posgrado Medicina y Salud Anestesiologa Farmacia
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud (no médico) Enfermera Cuidadora
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud MEDICO Remisero
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud Médico Técnica en depilación láser
Actualmente con un posgrado en curso Medicina y Salud Médico Medico de planta de clínica
Actualmente con un posgrado en curso Medicina y Salud Medico residente de posgrado en Pediatria. ( cursando el 3er año) Vendedor en una perfumeria
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud Médica Cuidadora de paciente
Graduado de posgrado Medicina y Salud Medico Cuidadora
Graduado de posgrado Medicina y Salud Medico Empleado en tienda venta de quesos, licores, dulces.
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud Médico Cuidadora domiciliaria
Actualmente en la universidad Marketing y Comercio Community Manager! Trabajo como Community manager en un centro estético médico “ibody Center”
Graduado de posgrado Ingeniería Petrolera Ingeniero de producción/planificación, representante técnico comercial Operario de limpieza
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Mecánica Ingeniero de operaciones en campo petrolero Seguridad
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Petrolera Ingeniero de Yacimientos Operario en una fábrica
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Industrial Líder de producción petrolera Coordinador de limpieza
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Informática Gerente y Asesor Desarrollador de Aplicaciones Web
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud (no médico) Enfermera Cuidador de pacientes
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Industrial Ingeniero Industrial y Representante de Ventas de Repuestos Automotrices Ayudante de Cocina
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Mecánica Ingeniero mecánico especialidad Piping Trabajo como asistente de ingeniería, estoy en blanco pero me pagan una parte en negro
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Mecánica Ingeniero de Mantenimiento, Mecánico
Graduado de posgrado Finanzas Gerente de Tecnologia Gerente de IT
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Mecánica Ingeniero de Proyectos Ingeniero de mantenimiento en Later - Cer
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Eléctrica Supervisor de Mantenimiento Oficial de mantenimiento eléctrico
Graduado de posgrado Educación y Pedagogía Investigadora yEducadora museística Cuidadora
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Industrial Ingeniero de campo en perforación de pozos petrolíferos Comunity manager, supervisor de almacén
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Petrolera Ingeniero de proceso Atención al cliente en un kiosco
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Civil Jefe de obra y proyectista Supervisor de obra bajo monotributista
Actualmente con un posgrado en curso Ingeniería Petrolera Minería y Petróleo Shopper de Rappi
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Mecánica Supervisor Mecánico,en la industria petrolera. Empresa de transporte
Graduado de la universidad Ciencias de la Computación Técnico de Computación y Redes Encargado de deposito de repuestos
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Agronómica En venezuela me dedicaba a la producción de frutas y hortalizas! Encargado de una cervecería artesanal! , y ayudante de carpinteria
Actualmente con un posgrado en curso Ingeniería Industrial Trabajar en el área de la Seguridad industrial y gestión ambiental Repositora de mercaderia
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Química Ingeniero de proyectos Higienista de calidad
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Mecánica Ingeniero Taller mecánico
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Petrolera Asistente administrativa Vendedor
Graduado de una escuela técnica/de oficios Carpintería Electricista industrial
Graduado de una escuela técnica/de oficios Mecanico para chrysler Ayudante de obrero
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Petrolera Comerciante Atencion al publico
Graduado de la universidad Administración de Empresas Administrador Comprador Senior
Actualmente con un posgrado en curso Ingeniería de Sistemas Gerente de Proyectos Analistas Sr en monitoreo
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Forestal Estudiante Universitario Camarero
Graduado de la universidad Ciencias de la Computación Consultor Sap Consultor SAP
Graduado de la universidad Administración de Empresas Consultor de Ventas en el Área de Telecomunicaciones Ventas de auto, por ahora solo un solo empleo
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud (no médico) Enfermería Enfermería
Graduado de la universidad Educación y Pedagogía Docente orientadora. Directora de escuela Cancha deportiva
Actualmente en la universidad Marketing y Comercio Estudio Vendedora en unan tienda de ropa
Graduado de posgrado Arquitectura Presidente de una empresa de proyectos y construcción. director de proyectos
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud (no médico) Licenciada en Enfermería Cuidadora de ancianos en blanco, asistencia en el hogar en negro
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Petrolera Estudiar Cajero en Western Union
Actualmente en la universidad Ingeniería Informática Auxiliar de publicaciones de una aerolínea Ayudante de cocina
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Civil Ingeniero Civil Cajero en supermercado
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Petrolera Ingeniero de petróleo, como mudlogger en compañía americana Actualmente estoy cambiando de trabajo, estaba en una contrata (servicio tercerizado) de servicio técnico de una compañía de cable  trabajo en "gris" (parte en blanco parte en negro) y me estoy cambiando a una empresa de software como operador SAP. en blanco
Graduado de la universidad Artes y Diseño Violinista de Orquesta y profesor de música Maestranza
Graduado de la universidad Psicología y Psicopedagogía Estudiar y trabajar como empleado 1. Trabajo como fotógrafo de eventos sociales (bodas, 15 años, graduaciones, etc).  2. Trabajo de medio tiempo como encargado de un deposito de perfumeria
Graduado de la escuela secundaria Estudiante Mozo, vendedor
Graduado de la universidad Comunicación, Imagen y Sonido Agente de Viajes recepcionista en el día (formal), telemarketer de una pizzería (informal
Graduado de posgrado Otra (especifique) Traductor e intérprete de conferencias y traductor jurado Profesor de inglés in Compact y traductor autónomo monotributista.
Graduado de la escuela secundaria Estudiante de ing de sistemas de la universidad de los andes Mozo
Graduado de la escuela secundaria Tecnico Electronico Tecnico electronico
Graduado de la universidad Relaciones Públicas Asistente Call center
Graduado de una escuela técnica/de oficios Traductor de inglés Monotributista independiente
Actualmente en la escuela secundaria Estudiante Agente de cobranzas call center
Graduado de una escuela técnica/de oficios Tripulante de cabina Camarero
Actualmente en la universidad Ingeniería Química Estudiante Encargado de un restaurante
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Industrial Investigador Analista semi senior de marketing don’t
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud Estudiante de medicina Especialista de productos en empresa de venta de insumos médicos
Graduado de la universidad Medicina y Salud (no médico) Enfermera Acompañante de pacientes
Actualmente en la universidad Administración de Empresas Estudiante Call center
Graduado de la universidad Derecho y Criminología Abogada Cuidadora domiciliaria
Actualmente con un posgrado en curso Medicina y Salud Odontologa Odontologa
Graduado de la universidad Otra (especifique) Militar Activo. Me fui de baja en el grado de Teniente de Fragata Call Center de Cobranzas.  Limpieza de casas.  Manicura y Pedicura.
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Eléctrica Gerencia de Ingenieria y construccion Cuidador geriátrico
Graduado de la universidad Psicología y Psicopedagogía Psicóloga Mensajeria ( glovo y rappi). Y empleada doméstica
Actualmente en la universidad Medicina y Salud Lavados de autos Repartidor domiciliario .
Graduado de la universidad Artes y Diseño Estudiante Comerciante
Graduado de la universidad Otra (especifique) Analista de operaciones internacionales Cajera
Graduado de la universidad Ingeniería Electrónica Técnico electrónico sistema de incendios Técnico sistemas de incendios Prosegur
Graduado de la universidad Comunicación, Imagen y Sonido Locutor , periodista Analista de Recursos humanos, locutor, coach ontológico asistiendo a emprendedores para el logro de sus objetivos
Figure 43 
 
















































Case study of Venezuelan engineers 
 
According to the DNM, 16,234 Venezuelan engineers have migrated to Argentina from 
2015-2018, making it the largest collective group of Venezuelan professionals living in 
Argentina.  Of the 278 respondents to the Economic Integration Survey, 101 are engineers and 
therefore make up 36.33% of the entire survey population.  In figure 44 below it is seen how the 
unemployment rate of surveyed Venezuelan engineers is high at 37.62% and slightly higher than 
the unemployment rate of the entire survey population (36.03%).  It should be noted, although, 
that as is the case with the entire survey population, a high percentage of engineers (31.68%) 
arrived in Argentina less than one year ago.  This suggests that many may not have had a fair 
amount of time to settle down and find employment before taking this survey and that the 
unemployment rate may be higher than it would be had more migrants arrived earlier.   
Among the employed group of surveyed Venezuelan engineers, 46.03% considered 
themselves underemployed as seen in Figure 45.  Figure 46 shows that among the 
underemployed, 86.21% consider themselves only skills-related underemployed, 6.9% consider 
themselves only time-related underemployed, and 6.9% consider themselves both skills & time-
related underemployed.  This means a significant majority of the underemployed (93.10%) feel 
that their education, skills, and professional qualifications are not being fully utilized in their 
current occupation while only a minority (13.80%) are working part-time but want to and are 
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In order to learn more about the employment situation of Venezuelan engineers in 
Argentina, interviews were conducted both with Dr. Gabriela Sala and Carmen Rodriguez, 
director of the professional association Ingenieros Venezolanos en Argentina (IngVenAr)140.141  
Discussions with both Sala and Rodriguez both support findings from the Economic Integration 
Survey that suggest that underemployment is a serious problem suffered by many Venezuelan 
engineers in Argentina.     
Sala claims that the underemployment of Venezuelan engineers in Argentina is mostly a 
result of macro-economic factors rather than bureaucratic hurdles.  As the main causes, she cites 
a poor Argentine economy and a mismatch in the types of engineers currently in demand in 
Argentina versus the types that are being supplied by migrants.  Both Sala and Rodriguez assert 
 
140 IngVenAr was started as a non-profit professional association in 2017 with the primary objective of promoting 
the professional growth of the Venezuelan engineering community in Argentina.  Some of the organization’s primary 
activities include helping members search for jobs, educating members about the degree accreditation process, and 
collecting data that can then be shared with Argentine policymakers.   
141 Gabriela Sala, Interview with Dr. Gabriela Sala, Researcher at CONICET; Carmen Rodriguez, Interview with Carmen 
Rodriguez, Director at IngVenAr. 
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that the types of engineers currently in highest demand in Argentina are computer and systems 
engineers, which are a minority among Venezuelans.  Instead, most Venezuelan engineers living 
in Argentina are petroleum and industrial engineers previously employed in Venezuela’s 
petroleum sector.  Of the 101 Venezuelan engineers surveyed in the Economic Integration 
Survey, 33.66% are industrial or petroleum engineers while only 5.94% are computer or systems 
engineers.    
According to Sala, structural differences in the Argentine and Venezuelan economies 
have naturally created demand for different types of engineers in each country.  Unfortunately, 
this means that there are not enough jobs for the many immigrating petroleum and industrial 
engineers from Venezuela, some of whom were initially drawn to Argentina because of its 
developed petroleum industry.  However, she notes that the petroleum industry in Argentina is 
markedly smaller than its counterpart in Venezuela and therefore does not offer an equal amount 
of job opportunities, resulting in unemployment and underemployment.   
Making matters worse, Rodriguez, who is a petroleum engineer herself, claims that the 
skills and knowledge of petroleum engineering are very specific to the field and are not easily 
transferrable to other forms of engineering.  Both Sala and Rodriguez also believe that the 
problem of underemployment will only worsen as more Venezuelan engineers migrate to 
Argentina and compete for the same amount of jobs.  In fact, Sala claims, “even before the 
arrival of Venezuelans, the labor market for engineers was in crisis in Argentina so you can only 
imagine the large impact all these new Venezuelan engineers are having [translated from 
Spanish].” 
Moreover, Salsa divides the migratory flow of Venezuelan petroleum and industrial 
engineers to Argentina into two waves.  The first arrived between 2003-2004 after Hugo Chávez 
fired almost half of PDVSA’s workforce for leading a strike that wreaked havoc on the 
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Venezuelan economy.  According to Sala, while the majority of these fired engineers left to the 
U.S. and Canada, a small proportion decided to emigrate to Argentina.  Rebounding from the 
country’s 2001 economic collapse and bolstered by high oil prices, Argentina’s oil industry 
experienced a period of growth during this period.  As a result, this small group of Venezuelan 
engineers in Argentina were able to find well-paying jobs with YPF, the country’s largest oil 
company that at the time was majority-owned by the Spanish corporate giant Repsol.  In Sala’s 
words, “this first wave of Venezuelan engineers was successfully integrated into the Argentine 
labor force in a manner in which their education and skills were fully utilized, resulting in few 
incidences of underemployment [translated from Spanish].” 
The second and current wave of Venezuelan petroleum and industrial engineers includes 
those that have arrived within the last five years in response to Venezuela’s current economic 
and political crises.  As Sala explains, unlike during the first wave, the Argentine petroleum 
industry has been unable to absorb the much larger numbers of Venezuelan engineers that have 
arrived during this second wave.  Compounding the problem have been constant delays in the 
development of the Vaca Muerta shale oil and gas field, which is still expected to fuel job growth 
as an estimated 22.5 billion barrels of oil reserves begin to be exploited.  These delays are 
attributed to low global oil prices and current economic difficulties in Argentina, which have 
disincentivized new development.   
Furthermore, the cost of living is prohibitively high in the primary regions of oil 
development in Neuquén and Río Negro.  According to Sala, unlike migrants from the first 
wave, migrants in the second wave often arrive in Argentina with little to no financial resources.  
Many of these migrants are forced to sell all their personal belongings just to migrate to 
Argentina and are unable to afford the high housing prices in the areas where they are most 
likely to find jobs in their areas of expertise.   
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Both Sala and Rodriguez claim that these regions are in fact more expensive to live in 
than the city of Buenos Aires and that many engineers must first accept less-skilled jobs in 
Buenos Aires to improve their financial standing before taking the risk of moving to the 
relatively more expensive oil producing areas with the hope of finding employment.  According 
to Sala, not already living in these regions is a major impediment to finding employment since 
employers look more favorably upon the many job-seeking engineers already residing in the 
area. In summary, a combination of oversupply of petroleum engineers, delays in the 
development of Vaca Muerta, and high housing prices in the oil producing regions of Argentina 
have contributed to high unemployment and underemployment among this second wave of 
Venezuelan petroleum and industrial engineers.   
Speaking more generally about all types of Venezuelan engineers, Sala suggests that 
most underemployment is characterized by macro-underemployment rather than micro-
underemployment.  As previously discussed, this means that engineers are underemployed at the 
group, rather than at the individual level.  Exceptions however are found in the cases of older 
engineers and female engineers, who are often discriminated against because of their age or 
gender.  Both Rodriguez and Sala pointed out that it is a challenge for older, more experienced 
engineers to find work in Argentina because companies are unwilling to pay their higher salaries 
and, in the case of computer and systems engineers, are looking for younger engineers educated 
in the latest technologies.  This stands in contrast to Venezuela, where older engineers are 
usually valued more highly than younger engineers.  Sala also notes that for years female 
engineers have been a minority in Argentina and those that are in the profession are often paid 
less or offered fewer job opportunities.   
In the case of Venezuelan engineers, degree accreditation does not appear to be a major 
contributor to underemployment.  As Rodriguez points out, “most engineers are not required to 
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get their degrees accredited in order to practice.  Only engineers that are hired for top positions 
and that sign off on projects in the areas of civil engineering, infrastructure, construction, or 
public safety are required to get their degrees accredited [translated from Spanish].”  However, 
she notes that if a Venezuelan engineer does need to get their degree accredited, it is often 
delayed in processing since priority is given to the degree accreditation of doctors, who are in 
high demand in Argentina.  This, in turn, could lead to temporary underemployment for senior-
level Venezuelan engineers while they wait for accreditation.  Nevertheless, Sala claims that 
most senior engineering positions requiring accreditation are currently held by Argentines, who 
she says are more likely to be hired for these positions due to their strong local industry 
connections.   
Case study of Venezuelan medical doctors 
 
According to the DNM, 4,517 medical professionals have migrated to Argentina from 
Venezuela between 2015 and 2018.  This makes this group of professionals the third largest 
among Venezuelan migrants behind engineers and business professionals.  This study has 
decided to focus on the subset of medical professionals that are medical doctors.  48 medical 
doctors completed the Economic Integration Survey, representing 17.27% of all respondents.  As 
seen below in Figure 47, the unemployment rate of Venezuelan medical doctors in Argentina is 
27.66% and therefore lower than the unemployment rate of the entire population of 36.03% and 
of Venezuelan engineers of 37.62%.  
  Figure 48 shows that half of all medical doctors responded as being underemployed.  
Figure 49 shows that of those who are underemployed 88.24% are only skills-related 
underemployed, 5.88% are only time-related underemployed, and 5.88% are both time and 
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To learn more about the employment situation of Venezuelan medical doctors, an 
interview was conducted with Dr. Juan Villalobos, the president of the professional association 
for Venezuelan doctors Asociación Venezolana de Médicos en Argentina 
(ASOMEVENAR)142.143  Villalobos acknowledges that underemployment is a problem for 
Venezuelan medical doctors, but for reasons different from those of Venezuelan engineers.  
Unlike engineers, Villalobos says that underemployment of medical doctors is primarily 
attributed to bureaucratic obstacles and not economic ones.  He asserts that there is a serious 
shortage of medical doctors in the provincial areas of Argentina that is creating job opportunities 
for foreign medical doctors from countries like Venezuela.  Villalobos attributes this shortage to 
a geographic imbalance of doctors in Argentina in which there are too many doctors in Greater 
Buenos Aires and not enough in the interior of the country.   
 
142 ASOMEVENAR was started by Dr. Juan Villalobos along with five other Venezuelan doctors on February 9, 2018 
in Buenos Aires.  According to the organization’s website, ASOMEVENAR is “dedicated to promoting the 
development and professional growth of all Venezuelan doctors located in the Republic of Argentina [translated 
from Spanish]” It currently has over 1,000 members in over 23 Argentine provinces.   
143 Juan Villalobos, Interview with Juan Villalobos, President of ASOMEVENAR. 
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As Villalobos says, “there are jobs for Venezuelan doctors if they are willing to live away 
from Buenos Aires.” The Venezuelan medical community through ASOMEVENAR actively 
collaborates with the Argentine federal and provincial governments to use Venezuelan doctors to 
help fill this void in demand in the Argentine provinces.  In the conversation with the press 
director of the DNM, Hugo Moujan, it was mentioned how ASOMEVENAR worked with 
government officials from the province of Tierra de Fuego to organize an event this past June at 
the Casa de Tierra de Fuego in Buenos Aires for the purpose of educating Venezuelan doctors 
about job opportunities in the southern Patagonia province.  As of today, Villalobos estimates 
that there are 900 Venezuelan doctors working in Buenos Aires and 250 in the provinces.   
Moreover, Villalobos explains how underemployment among Venezuelan doctors is 
mostly due to delays in the degree accreditation process.  Since foreign medical professionals are 
not allowed to practice in Argentina without having their degrees accredited, they are forced to 
work elsewhere while awaiting accreditation.  These interim jobs are often low-skilled, low-
paying, and according to Villalobos include mostly working as Uber drivers or as aides to elderly 
people.  Fortunately, the processing time for accreditation was reduced for Venezuelans by the 
Argentine government in November 2018 in large part because of lobbying from 
ASOMEVENAR and recognition of the fact that there is a need for more doctors in Argentina.  
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In Figure 50 above, survey respondents who are underemployed were asked the question, 
“How confident are you that you will no longer be underemployed one year from now?”.  As can 
be seen, with an average weighted score of 3.9 most respondents have a positive outlook towards 
the future and feel optimistic that they will no longer be underemployed one year from now.  
Those who were optimistic also constitute the largest group by percentage, accounting for 
44.44% of the total.  Indeed only 6.67% responded as being pessimistic or very pessimistic 
towards their future state of underemployment.     
Actions already taken by the Argentine Gov. to Reduce Underemployment 
 
With increasing numbers of Venezuelan migrants arriving, the Argentine government has 
already taken important, meaningful measures to facilitate their integration.  These measures 
COLUMNS WEIGHT 
Muy pesimista 1 
Pesimista 2 
Ni pesimista ni optimista 3 
Optimista 4 








have both helped reduce underemployment and have allowed Argentina to take better advantage 
of the full economic potential of migrants.  Such measures have included reducing requirements 
and expediting the process for degree accreditation, updating and streamlining the residency 
application process, and matching migrants to job vacancies in the interior of the country using 
better data collection and a new digital employment search platform.   
Changes in the degree accreditation process: 
 
One of the ways Argentina has worked to reduce migrant underemployment and facilitate 
integration in the labor market is by improving the degree accreditation process for Venezuelan 
migrants.  This is especially important since such a large percentage of Venezuelan migrants in 
Argentina are professionals.  As seen below in Figure 51, almost half of all respondents to the 
Economic Integration Survey have undergone the process of getting their degrees from 


























Moreover, currently in Argentina there are two processes towards degree accreditation 
referred to as “reválida” and “convalidación.”  Figure 52 below provides an outline of both 
accreditation processes.  
Figure 52 
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(Data from Argentine Ministry of Education) 
 
Reválida is the process that must be taken by migrants who are not from a country that 
has a bilateral education agreement with Argentina.  As part of this process, degree accreditation 
is initiated through a public Argentine university of the applicant’s choice.  The university board 
then reviews the applicant’s course of study from the foreign university where they received their 
degree.  Based on the board’s evaluation, applicants may then be required to take additional 
courses or exams in order to be complete the accreditation process.  Each public university is 
autonomous in its evaluation and has its own specific requirements.144  
At the end of the reválida process, applicants are granted a degree and diploma from the 
Argentine university through which they applied.  It should be noted that diplomas of applicants 
 
144 “Convalidaciones de Titulos Universitarios Extranjeros.” 
 
Countries without a bilateral agreement Countries with a bilateral agreement 
Reválida Convalidación 
Thru a national university Thru the Ministry of Education 
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who complete the reválida process are clearly marked with the word “reválida” and are therefore 
differentiated from the diplomas of regular graduates.145  Based on my conversations with both 
Carmen Rodriguez and Dr. Juan Villalobos, the reválida process for engineers and medical 
doctors was the same and typically took on average between two to four years to complete since 
universities usually have stringent requirements for coursework and exams.  
Convalidación, on the other hand, is the accreditation process taken by migrants who are 
from a country that does have a bilateral education agreement in place with Argentina.  Currently 
this includes Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Spain, Mexico, Peru, and Ukraine.  
Applicants from these countries apply for accreditation through the Argentine Ministry of 
Education rather than through a university.  Moreover, the convalidación process is entirely 
digitized and is completed on the government’s online Tramites a Distancia (TAD) platform.  
The Ministry of Education then places the applicant on a “direct” or “indirect” path for 
accreditation. Whether an applicant is redirected to the “direct” or “indirect” path depends on the 
bilateral agreement in place, the type of degree being accredited, and the applicant’s home 










145 Silvana Tortone, Interview with Silvana Tortone, Adm. at Universidad Nacional de Cordoba. 




























(Data from Argentine Ministry of Education) 
 
As the name suggests, applicants that qualify for the “direct” path are given immediate 
accreditation by the review committee at the Ministry of Education.  Alternatively, those who are 
placed on the “indirect” path have their course of study sent by the Ministry of Education to be 
reviewed by an Argentine university.147  After review, the Argentine university may then provide 
the Ministry of Education with recommendations on certain exams that should be taken before 
the applicant is granted accreditation.  Following this step and the successful completion of any 
exams deemed necessary, the Ministry of Education then grants the applicant on the “indirect” 
convalidación path an accreditation certifying that they can practice professionally in 
Argentina.148   
 
147 “Convalidaciones de Titulos Universitarios Extranjeros.” 
148 Silvana Tortone, Interview with Silvana Tortone, Adm. at Universidad Nacional de Cordoba. 
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However, unlike the reválida process, those who complete the convalidación process are 
not granted an equivalency degree from an Argentine university.  Rather they are given a 
declaration from the Ministry of Education allowing them to practice professionally using the 
degree from their home university.149  According to Rodriguez and Villalobos, the average lead 
time for completing the accreditation process through the “indirect” path of the convalidación 
process takes between six months to a year and is therefore significantly shorter than the reválida 
process.  
 Since Venezuela had no prior education agreement with Argentina, Venezuelan migrants 
were forced to undergo the slower reválida process for degree accreditation in order to be 
allowed to legally practice professionally.  Yet in recognition of the humanitarian crisis 
occurring and citing the need to “resolve specific cases coming from countries in institutional 
crisis and/or armed conflict that do not have an agreement regarding the recognition of studies, 
degrees, diplomas, or academics with Argentina [translated from Spanish],” Argentina on July, 
2nd 2018 passed resolution 230-E/2018 allowing Venezuelan migrants to partake in the shorter 
convalidación process instead of the longer reválida process of accreditation.150   Although 
humanitarian in nature, there were also clear and obvious economic motives behind the 
resolution as it states, “This Ministry of Education of the nation considers this measure 
convenient and opportune as it will permit the incorporation into the national cognitive matrix 
the expertise of these professionals with the goal of complementing the supply of professionals 
and filling demand gaps in sectors of the economy [translated from Spanish].”151  A similar 
resolution was also passed for Syrian immigrants to Argentina as well. 
 
149  Silvana Tortone, Interview with Silvana Tortone, Adm. at Universidad Nacional de Cordoba. 




 As previously mentioned, this action taken by the Argentine government was important 
in helping reduce Venezuelan migrant underemployment, especially among doctors.  A process 
that had taken two to four years was reduced to six months to a year therefore allowing, for 
example, doctors to practice medicine sooner and engineers to be hired or promoted to higher 
and better paid positions requiring degree accreditation.  Previously, many of these professionals 
were forced into less-skilled professions or lower-level positions while awaiting accreditation.  
Villalobos did note that all Venezuelans who wish to get their degrees accredited regardless of 
profession currently need to go through the “indirect” path of convalidación since there is 
currently no bilateral education agreement in place between Argentina and Venezuela.  
Changes in the residency application process 
 
 Not surprisingly, obtaining residency is extremely important for migrants coming to 
Argentina since it is required to legally work or study.  In the past year, Argentina has 
streamlined the residency application process, making it quicker and easier for migrants to 
receive provisional and then temporary residency.  This has allowed migrants to join the 
Argentine labor market sooner and with less obstacles.  These changes have also helped reduce 
underemployment since having temporary residency is required for starting the degree 
accreditation process.152   
 In November 2018, Argentina improved the residency application process for migrants 
by replacing a series of in-person appointments at different government offices with a 
multipurpose online platform called Radex (Radicación a Distancia).153  Documents that 
previously needed to be collected in-person such as Argentine criminal records are now solicited 
directly online through Radex.154  One Venezuelan migrant living in Buenos Aires who 
 
152 Juan Villalobos, Interview with Juan Villalobos, President of ASOMEVENAR. 
153 Vincenzo Pensa, Interview with Vincenzo Pensa, President of Asoven. 
154 Direccion Nacional de Migraciones (DNM), “Está En Marcha La Radicación a Distancia.” 
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performed the residency application process before Radex said that he and other migrants were 
forced to travel and make appointments at government offices in areas of Argentina outside of 
Buenos Aires, sometimes on the other side of the country, in order to avoid the long wait times 
for the same appointment in Buenos Aires.  According Vincenzo Pensa, the average wait time 
for an appointment with the DNM in Buenos Aires was one year prior to the introduction of 
Radex.  During this time, migrants were legally unable to work or enroll in a university.   
Now migrants can begin the residency process immediately after arrival on their own 
time and are instantly granted provisional residency, valid for 90 days, through the online system 
once all documents are submitted and the processing fee of 3,000 pesos (~USD $50) is paid.  
With provisional residency, migrants can already perform most activities such as work, enroll in 
a university program, rent an apartment, or obtain a driver’s license.  Temporary residency, valid 
for two years, and a national ID card (referred to as a DNI) are then mailed to the applicant’s 
address between 60 and 90 days after provisional residency has been granted.155  As previously 
mentioned, migrants currently cannot begin the degree accreditation process until they have 
received their temporary residency and DNI.    
Similar to the way entrance requirements for Venezuelan migrants were relaxed in light 
of the country’s crisis, Argentina has also relaxed requirements for Venezuelans applying for 
residency. As previously mentioned, Argentina has continued to recognize Venezuela’s 
Mercosur membership despite the country’s suspension from the organization in December 
2016. Just as entrance requirements are less for Mercosur members, residency requirements are 
also significantly less for migrants from Mercosur countries than for those from non-Mercosur 
countries.  To reside in Argentina a member of a Mercosur country need only provide a national 
 




ID card, a copy of their criminal record from their home country, a copy of their criminal record 
from Argentina, and proof of residence in Argentina.156   
These requirements have further been reduced for Venezuelan migrants in recognition of 
the fact that official documents from the Venezuelan government are difficult to obtain due to 
institutional instability and the government’s inability or lack of desire to service the 
overwhelmingly high demand for documents as hordes of people flee the country.  For this 
reason, the DNM in February 2018 declared that migrants would no longer need to provide 
criminal records from Venezuela in order to obtain residency.157  In line with its entrance 
policies, Argentina has also decided to accept expired Venezuelan national ID’s from those 
seeking residency and allow children under the age of nine to obtain residency with only a birth 
certificate.158  Similarly, in July 2018, the Ministry of Education passed Resolution 232-E/2018 
allowing migrant children to enroll in school in Argentina with incomplete, not apostilled, or 
missing documentation.  As part of the resolution, children without any documentation are 
afforded the opportunity to take an international placement exam as a means of determining their 
level of education.159    
Improving the geographic distribution of workers 
 
Hugo Moujan, the press director for the DNM, insists that despite Argentina’s high 
unemployment rate of around 10%, there is an ample amount of jobs for both natives and 
immigrants alike.  Similar to the previously discussed case of medical doctors, he claims that 
many of these job opportunities are outside of Buenos Aires and located in the interior of the 
country.  In Moujan’s words, “the problems of unemployment and underemployment are 
attributed to a geographical imbalance in the supply and demand of workers in Argentina that is 
 
156 Direccion Nacional de Migraciones (DNM), “Obtener Una Residencia Temporaria Por Nacionalidad.” 
157 “El Gobierno Simplifica Los Requisitos Para La Entrada de Venezolanos al Pais.” 
158 Hugo Moujan, Interview with Hugo Moujan, DNM Press Director. 
159 “Resolución 232-E/2018.” 
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characteristic of a country with limited labor mobility [translated from Spanish].”  In the case of 
Venezuelan migrants, who are heavily concentrated in Greater Buenos Aires, the goal of the 
DNM is to convince migrants to move elsewhere in the country where there is actual demand for 
their expertise.  According to Moujan, this will not only help migrants find better jobs but will 
also relieve pressure on the Buenos Aires job market while filling important gaps in the demand 
for labor in the provinces.    
In pursuit of this objective, the DNM first began by improving their data collection 
methods.  They did so by asking migrants questions about their skills, education, and 
professional backgrounds as part of the residency application process through Radex.  With this 
information, they have been able to learn more about migrants’ competencies and where and 
how they can best be integrated into the national labor market.  After analyzing the data, they 
realized that many Venezuelan migrants have the skills and expertise currently in shortage in 
many labor markets outside of Buenos Aires.   
Armed with this data, the government formally started a new initiative called Orientación 
de Fluyos Migratorios with the stated goal of encouraging immigrants in Argentina to move to 
the provinces.  Although this program is aimed towards migrants from all places, Moujan claims 
that the recent large wave of Venezuelan migrants to Argentina was the driving force for its 
development.  Central to the program is a new, digital employment search platform that will help 
provinces directly market job opportunities to employment seekers.  Assisting the DNM in 
developing this platform are the ILO, the IOM, and the United Nations Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR).  Although primarily intended to help migrants find employment, the platform will be 
made available for use by Argentines as well.  However, Moujan says that convincing 
Argentines to locate or re-locate away from Buenos Aires has always been a challenge that 
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At the time this thesis was written, four provinces had already agreed to participate in the 
program.  Nevertheless, the platform and the government initiative to encourage migrants to 
move to the interior of the country is not without its sceptics.  One of whom is Sala, who is 
worried about the potential negative impact these migratory flows will have on provincial 
economies and their labor markets, which she says, “are much more fragile than those in Buenos 
Aires [translated from Spanish].”  
To determine the willingness of Venezuelan migrants to relocate within Argentina, 
migrants were asked in the Economic Integration Survey if they were willing to move to another 
city in Argentina if there were better job opportunities available.  The results in Figure 54 below 
show that a 77.57% majority of respondents were willing to do relocate for better job 
opportunities, while 10.66% were not, and 11.76% were not sure.  These are positive results for 
the DNM as they surge forward with the Orientación de Fluyos Migratorios initiative and 





   
 
 














What migrants say Argentina can do to reduce underemployment 
 
As part of the Economic Integration Survey, underemployed Venezuelan migrants were 
asked about what measures they felt the Argentine government could take to help reduce the 
problem of underemployment among Venezuelans.  The responses reflected a series of re-
occurring themes.  The most common with 33 of the 90 responses was related to further reforms 
in the residency and degree accreditation processes.  These responses were focused on further 
reducing requirements, bureaucratic hurdles, and processing times.   
Some notable suggestions regarding the degree accreditation process included allowing 
Venezuelan university graduates to pass through the “direct” rather than the “indirect” path for 
accreditation and accepting documentation that is not apostilled.  Regarding the residency 
application process, some respondents answered that quickening the process is imperative since 
some employers disobey the law and refuse to hire migrants who only have provisional residency 
status.  A few of the many responses related to degree accreditation and residency are listed 
below:  
En su opinión, ¿qué medidas podría tomar el gobierno argentino para reducir el 
subempleo de los inmigrantes venezolanos? 
 
“Agilizar los trámites de convalidacion para los títulos de los venezolanos… Si pienso que gran 
parte de los trámites han avanzado pero no lo suficiente” 
 
“Reconocer los títulos de los extranjeros (venezolanos) sin tener que volver a estudiar cuando en 
muchos casos tenemos postgrado y hasta doctorado” 
 
“Resolver oportuna y prontamente el documento de residencia (DNI) de los inmigrantes, y 
agilizar la convalidación de los títulos” 
 
“Hacer mas facil los convenios de convalidacion y sin tanta burocracia” 
 
 A second frequent suggestion called for the Argentine government to take an active role 
in relocation efforts.  These responses show that many migrants are willing to move to another 
province where jobs are available but lack the information necessary for making an informed 
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decision.  Some migrants even believe that the government should not only help them find job 
vacancies but, in some cases, assign them jobs based on their skills and qualifications and where 
there is regional demand.  As discussed, the government is already working on a solution to 
geographic imbalances in labor supply as part of the initiative Orientación de Fluyos 
Migratorios.  Some responses related to relocation are listed below:   
En su opinión, ¿qué medidas podría tomar el gobierno argentino para reducir el 
subempleo de los inmigrantes venezolanos? 
 
“Reubicarnos en las provincias adecuadas a la profesión con un trabajo asignado según las 
vacantes y experiencia” 
 
“Insertarnos en vacantes de acuerdo a las profesiones. Bien sea en lo publico o privado” 
“Planes de inserción” 
 
“Evaluar para que son buenos y capaces y ubicarlos según la necesidad que se presente en el 
país, por ejemplo yo pudiera desarrollarme en el proyecto de Vaca Muerta en Neuquén” 
 
“Controlar la distribucion de extranjeros que radican en zonas especificas del pais, como ejem 
CABA” 
 
“Buscar la manera de realizar charlas y hablar sobre otras provincias y las oportunidades que en 
ellas se presentan” 
 
“Pues tratar de crear un sistema de apoyo y ubicacion de los profesionales competentes de mi 
pais y ubicarlos en empresas o provincias donde se necesiten nuestros conocimientos venimos 
con humildad y ganas de hacer crecer al pais que nos acoge empleando nuestros conocimientos 
no merecemos ser profesionales y trabajar en negro como un imigrante sin estudios” 
 
“Mejor canalización de trabajadores del sector a trabajos de ese respectivo sector, considerando 
déficits y superávits en las distintas regiones” 
 
“Planes de redistribución a lo largo del territorio” 
  
 Some migrants also suggested that the Argentine government sponsor work training 
programs for migrants focused on skills and certifications needed for professions in demand in 
Argentina.  Others thought that the government should work directly with the private sector and 
devise ways Venezuelans can be better incorporated into the private economy.  For example, one 
comment listed below cites that the government should encourage private engineering companies 
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to be less stringent about the requirements and qualifications needed for positions that typically 
require less skill or responsibility.  Other comments relating to training programs and 
collaboration with the private sector include: 
En su opinión, ¿qué medidas podría tomar el gobierno argentino para reducir el 
subempleo de los inmigrantes venezolanos? 
 
“Considero que están haciendo lo que esta en sus manos para ayudar a los venezolanos, pero 
debemos capacitarnos más, porque hay mucha competencia de profesionales en Argentina, sobre 
todo calificarnos con el nivel avanzado de ingles” 
 
“Campañas de educación. Las empresas y concientización” 
 
“Personalmente considero que es cuestión de seguir preparándose profesionalmente con estudios 
dentro de argentina para apoyar y avalar la preparacion profesional que se tiene previamente con 
certificaciones del país” 
 
“Trazar estrategia con las empresas” 
 
“…En el área de Ingenieria el gobierno debería tratar de entablar un dialogo con las empresas 
privadas para que no sean tan cerradas en buscar experiencias muy especificas para trabajos con 
poca responsabilidad, Ejemplo en el área de petrolera busca personal con 5 o mas años de 
experiencia en yacimientos No convencionales como factor excluyente, en argentina tienen poco 
tiempo trabajando con ese tipo de yacimiento, en el mundo pocos países explota ese tipo de 
yacimiento y dudo mucho que algún profesional con ese perfil prefiera venir a argentina en vez 
de otros países mas desarrollados” 
 
Another suggestion migrants had for government policymakers was to perform more 
surveys and release data that could then be helpful for finding better jobs.  In fact, the 
government has collected significant census and economic data but could do a better job of 
sharing and distributing the results.  Most of this data is public and available but hidden amongst 
intricate and often confusing government websites.  The government should consolidate relevant 
data into one report and distribute it to the various Venezuelan community organizations and 
leaders.  A labor report broken down by industry and province would also be useful not only for 
migrants but for all job seekers in Argentina. Some comments relevant to data collection and 
reporting are cited below: 
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En su opinión, ¿qué medidas podría tomar el gobierno argentino para reducir el 
subempleo de los inmigrantes venezolanos? 
 
“Censo y empleos formales” 
 
“Realizar y tomar en cuenta encuestas cómo está para distribuirnos de acuerdo a nuestra 
profesión en las provincias con déficit de estas” 
 
“Hacer un estudio de la áreas de producción inactivas y colocar esa mano de obra profesional 
venezolana para activar el aparato productivo” 
 
“Realizar y tomar en cuenta encuestas cómo estás para distribuirnos de acuerdo a nuestra 
profesión en las provincias con déficit de estas” 
 
 Finally, a significant number of Venezuelans felt that there was nothing more that the 
government could do to reduce migrant underemployment.  Other migrants focused more on 
suggestions for changes in long-term macro-economic policies rather than shorter-term 
administrative policy changes.  Although important, these suggestions are obviously more open 
to debate and unlikely to exact immediate change.  Responses of these types include: 
En su opinión, ¿qué medidas podría tomar el gobierno argentino para reducir el 
subempleo de los inmigrantes venezolanos? 
 
“No es problema del gobierno” 
 
“En mi caso como profesional universitario latinoamericana, creo que nos están dando un trato 
considerado, humanitario y aprovechando nuestro recurso humano para cubrir algunas áreas 
laborales” 
 
“en este momento no se que podrá hacer el gobierno para poder reducir esto!” 
 
“Ninguno por ahora” 
 
“No es fácil por los problemas que pasa la economía” 
 
“Bajar los impuestos y dar paso a las inversiones y empresas extranjeras” 
 
“Reducir impuestos a los comerciantes. Y así puedan contratar más personal” 
 






Venezuelan community organization  
 
 In the short time that most Venezuelans have been in Argentina they have become very 
well organized as a community.  This has facilitated the spread of information including about 
employment opportunities.  Professional associations such as IngVenAr and ASOMEVENAR 
have united professionals under a single umbrella and harnessed the collective power of their 
members.  Villalobos estimates, for example, that 80-90% of Venezuelan medical doctors are 
members of ASOMEVENAR.  As Villalobos says, “It is incredibly important that so many 
Venezuelan doctors are organized into a single organization as it provides us leverage for 
seeking better employment opportunities [translated from Spanish].”  Indeed, ASOMEVENAR 
was crucial in the lobbying efforts that resulted in the previously discussed changes in the degree 
accreditation process for Venezuelans.   
 Rodriguez notes that Argentine engineers are scattered into various professional 
organizations at both the national and provincial levels that include Centros Ingenieros, Colegios 
de Ingenieros, and Consejos Profesionales.  In contrast she says that in Venezuela all engineers 
form part of a single national organization called the Colegio de Ingenieros de Venezuela 
(C.I.V.).  When IngVenAr was created two years ago, the goal was to create an organization in 
Argentina that mirrored the C.I.V. and that would be more organized and have better lines of 
communication than the various organizations that are found in the Argentine model.   
These professional associations provide a plethora of resources and assistance for 
members.  Sophisticated social media pages include everything from job postings to detailed 
guides on the residency and degree accreditation processes.  Other Venezuelan community 
outreach organizations such as ASOVEN are more dedicated to serving the poorer segments of 
the Venezuelan community in Argentina.  As the president of ASOVEN, Vincezo Pensa, 
explains, “ASOVEN has been around since 1998, well before most Venezuelans started coming 
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to Argentina.  The purpose of the organization for over the first 15 years of its existence was to 
promote the culture of Venezuela and come together as a community for national celebrations a 
few times a year.  Yet, as the crisis in Venezuela worsened, we had to change direction 180 
degrees and now the goals and objectives of the organization are more focused on helping 
assisting migrants, especially the most vulnerable ones, to life in Argentina [translated from 
Spanish].”   
In addition to these more formal organizations, dozens of social media groups founded by 
Venezuelan migrants in Argentina are found on across various platforms such as Facebook, 
Instagram, or WhatsApp.  These include groups for migrants living in different cities or 
provinces in Argentina, groups for different types of professions ranging from barbers to graphic 
designers, groups for job seekers, political groups, and even groups for buying and selling goods 
or services.  Members of these groups actively support each other with answering questions, 
addressing doubts, or sharing opportunities.      
The extent and speediness at which the Venezuelan community has organized in 
Argentina is both impressive and an important factor in the discussion on underemployment.  
These professional association, community outreach organizations, and social media groups are 
important mediums for migrants to find employment and become knowledgeable about 
important procedures such as the residency and degree accreditation processes.  Some Argentine 
employers have even joined these online groups to advertise both skilled and unskilled job 
opportunities.   
Many Venezuelans even join these groups before making the decision to move to 
Argentina to learn more about the employment landscape in Argentina, the cost of living in 
Argentina, transportation routes to Argentina, and education in Argentina among many other 
things.  This knowledge makes integration and assimilation upon arrival less confusing and 
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quicker with less unexpected surprises.  Importantly, these groups also provide a sense of unity 
and security among Venezuelan migrants that may substitute the need for neighborhood 




























































































Additional suggestions for reducing underemployment 
 
In addition to the suggestions posted by respondents to the Economic Integration Survey, 
there are other recommendations that can be made to Argentine policymakers for helping reduce 
migrant underemployment, based on the findings of this study and my analysis of 
underemployment.  For example, earlier in this thesis it was discussed how Venezuelan 
petroleum engineers have trouble affording housing in areas where there are jobs available, most 
notably in Río Negro and Neuquén.  As a solution to this problem, Sala suggests that the 
government subsidize housing for migrant engineers for a short period of time until they can 
establish themselves financially.  Another option, according to Sala, would be for the 
government to build cheap housing in these regions for newly arrived migrant engineers and 
even to subsidize the cost of bus transportation to these areas from major cities such as Buenos 
Aires.    
Rental housing in general is a major issue that requires reform in Argentina.  According 
to Vincenzo Pensa, changes in housing policies would benefit both migrants and natives alike.  
Similar to many countries, renting in Argentina requires having a guarantor and leaving a 
deposit.  However, in Argentine proprietors tend to only rent to people who have a credit-
checked guarantor living in the same city or province.  An Argentine citizen from Cordoba with 
no personal connections in Buenos Aires, for example, would usually have difficulty finding 
rental housing in Buenos Aires despite being able to produce guarantors of good financial 
standing in Cordoba. 
Pensa claims that landlords’ strictness in deciding to whom to rent is due to Argentina’s 
“bien de familia” laws and the rights given to squatters that often make it difficult for landlords 
to evict nonpaying tenants.  In the case of Venezuelan migrants, this policy has made it 
extremely difficult to find rental housing.  For those with few options, guarantees are provided 
122 
 
by third-party private companies such as GarantíaYa but at prohibitively expensive rates that 
most migrants are unable to afford.  As a result, many migrants are forced to live in 
accommodations that resemble current-day tenements called pensiones.  One Venezuelan 
migrant who lived in a pensión for the first couple years after arrival described to me how a 
pensión worked and what the conditions are like.   
According to him, a pensión is a large house with roughly five bedrooms and two bunks 
beds in each room, thus equating to about 20 people total living together under one roof.  There 
is only one bathroom, normally commercial, with multiple stalls, urinals, and showers.  There is 
also a shared kitchen area.  The rent is very inexpensive at around 2,300 pesos per month (~USD 
$45).  Deposits in case of damage are only 500-1,000 pesos (~USD $10-$20), and no guarantees 
are required.  He says that although these houses are occupied by a revolving door of migrants 
from many different countries, the majority are from Venezuela.  He personally was only able to 
leave a pensión after two years by teaming up with two Argentine brothers who were able to 
provide a guarantee from local family members to rent an apartment in Buenos Aires.   
Due to these restrictive rental policies, many migrants are reluctant to move once finding 
suitable housing.  Labor mobility is thus reduced and greater underemployment results as 
migrants are dissuaded from moving to areas where there are better job opportunities.  With 
better accommodations, it is also more likely for migrants to be more productive at their current 
jobs.  In order to improve labor mobility, reduce underemployment, and improve the living 
conditions of migrants, reforms to policies regulating the process of renting an apartment may be 
beneficial.  In the short-term, the government could start a program where they act as guarantors 
for migrant workers at low rates.  In the long-term, policymakers could consider reforming 
squatter laws so that landlords are better protected from non-paying tenants.  This would make 
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landlords less fearful to rent to hardworking migrants and Argentines that are from out of the 
area.  
 Another suggestion for the government, brought up by Sala, that could reduce 
underemployment is a program of micro-credit for migrants.  Currently many migrants who want 
to start their own businesses or become independent contractors do not have the capital to do so 
and are forced to work in jobs that are less desirable.  An unemployed engineer, for example, 
could use cheap government capital to buy his or her own tools and start a new repair business.   
By investing in migrants, the government would thus be investing in future economic growth in 
the form of new small businesses and ventures.  The idea to assist migrants through better access 
to resources and factors of production has in fact already been explored in Neuquén.  According 
to Sala, a local farming association in Neuquén recently gave migrants access to community-
owned land that could be exploited at no cost.  The federal government and other provincial 
governments should focus on similar initiatives like this one that give migrants access to land or 
capital and provide the opportunity for better employment.     
 Finally, policymakers should consider fining employers who refuse to hire migrants 
because they only have provisional residency.  As Hugo Moujan explains, by law migrants with 
provisional residency have the right to work anywhere where degree accreditation is not 
required.  However, Vincenzo Pensa notes, along with many migrants who took the Economic 
Integration Survey, that many employers, especially in higher-paying professions, explicitly 
refuse to hire migrants who only have provisional residency.  This leads to greater 
underemployment particularly in the three months before temporary residency is finally granted.  
In the same spirit, policymakers should also consider allowing migrants to begin the degree 
accreditation process with only provisional residency rather than having to wait for temporary 
residency as is the current policy.  This would shorten the lead time for migrants who are 
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professionals to obtain jobs in their areas of expertise.  The plausibility of this policy change is 
even greater given that it seems that very few Venezuelan migrants are ultimately denied 
temporary residency.   
The Argentine government’s policy towards Venezuelan immigration 
 
In order to better understand the current and future disposition of the Argentine 
government towards the large volume of Venezuelan migrants, an interview was conducted with 
the press director for the DNM, Hugo Moujan, at the DNM’s office in downtown Buenos Aires.  
Moujan emphasizes that the Argentine government is committed to maintaining its open border 
policy for Venezuelan migrants.  He further asserts that it is unlikely that this policy will change 
even as a new presidential administration enters office on December 10th following the electoral 
victory of the opposition party, Frente de Todos, on October 28th.  He claims that immigration 
was not one of the top ten debate issues between the two major political parties during the 
election.  This stands in contrast to the fierce political debates occurring in other countries in the 
region that, as previously discussed, have in some cases led to new restrictions on Venezuelan 
migration. 
According to Moujan, “the respect Argentina has for the reception of migrants comes 
from a long, historical tradition of immigration that began even before Argentina was a nation 
[translated from Spanish].”  Moujan notes that early in Argentina’s history, political leaders such 
as Juan Alberdi, Domingo Sarmiento, and Nicolás Avellaneda prioritized immigration as a 
means of populating the country and promoting economic growth.  He continued by reaffirming 
that leaders today from across the political spectrum in Argentina respect this history and 
understand that Argentina is a country woven together by immigrants.  He asserts, “countries 
including Argentina, Spain, or Germany need immigrants to grow economically.  For this reason, 
rejecting immigrants and xenophobia are both errors [translated from Spanish].”   
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Moujan is also quick to point out that not all Venezuelan migrants to Argentina 
ultimately stay in Argentina.  He says that there is an outflow of Venezuelans similar to the one 
that occurred in the beginning of the 20th century when five million immigrants (mostly Spanish 
and Italian) came and stayed in Argentina while an additional five million came and left.  
Moujan claims that Venezuelans leave Argentina for a variety of reasons that include, “not liking 
Argentines, not liking the cold, finding there are no jobs, realizing there is no demand for their 
profession, missing their family living elsewhere, running out of money, or missing their 
boyfriend or girlfriend [translated from Spanish].”  As seen below in Figure 55, the data from the 
DNM does in fact show that there was sizeable outflow of Venezuelan migrants from Argentina 
in 2018 that totaled 80,957 people.   
 













Furthermore, after speaking to various Venezuelan migrants living in Buenos Aires and 
reading posts on social media, I got the premonition that the profile of Venezuelan migrants to 
Argentina was beginning to change.  There seemed to be larger numbers of less-educated and 
less-skilled Venezuelans coming to Argentina by bus, often after living in other countries outside 
of Venezuela for some time.  This new trend was confirmed by Moujan who now estimates that 
70% of Venezuelan migrants arrive by air and 30% arrive by land. This is a significant change 
from the 2018 DTM report which reported 90% of migrants arriving by air and 10% by land as 
Movimientos migratorios nacionalidad venezolana 
Dirección Total 2018 2019 (a marzo) 
Entrada 157,462 39,522 






well as the 2017 Aruj study which reported figures of 93.4% and 6.3% respectively.  In fact, it is 
a common trend in migration studies that poorer migrants tend to leave after those that are more 
affluent.  In the case of Venezuela, it seems that many migrants with few means first migrated to 
closer countries such as Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru and after making some money and/or 
finding difficulties establishing legal residency and/or in finding employment, decided to migrate 
once again to countries in the southern cone such as Chile or Argentina.     
Moujan does not believe that the arrival of greater numbers of less-skilled Venezuelan 
migrants will impact Argentina’s current open-door policy towards Venezuelans.  He says that 
even for the less skilled there are job opportunities in Argentina.  For example, he says that the 
government is currently working with the national rural association, Registro Nacional de 
Trabajadores Rurales y Empleadores (Renatre), to fill 10,000 jobs for agricultural workers in the 
Patagonia.  The challenge now, Moujan says, is spreading the word to natives and immigrants 
alike that these jobs are available.  When asked if Argentina would ever institute an immigration 
policy that selectively favors highly skilled immigrants, Moujan replied, “there is close to a zero 
chance of this happening any time soon in Argentina [translated from Spanish].”  
 Moujan also says that Argentina has taken a leadership position in the Proceso de Quito, 
a group of 13 Latin American nations that have come together to share information and 
strategize on a regional response to the Venezuelan migratory crisis.  In doing so, Moujan claims 
that Argentina is encouraging members to remain committed to accepting Venezuelan migrants 
just as Argentina has.  Currently Argentina is proposing that Venezuelan migrants be granted a 
regional mobility identification card that will replace Venezuelan passports, which are mostly 
expired, and allow free movement of migrants between countries until a place for permanent 
relocation is found. The card will also allow countries to share data on migrants about their 
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movements and other activities such as crimes committed.  Moujan notes that there are still many 
details to be worked out as part of the proposal, but he feels that it could be a promising project.    
 Finally, the topic of migrant underemployment was also brought up to Moujan.  
Specifically, he was asked if the government was planning to take any additional action toward 
reducing migrant underemployment or improving Venezuelan economic integration aside from 
the introduction of the new employment search platform that is the centerpiece of the 
Orientación de Fluyos Migratorios program.  In response, Moujan said that the answer is 
presently no and that the sentiment among most in the Argentine government is that Argentina is 
already doing enough to help Venezuelan migrants, especially compared to other countries.  He 
re-iterated, “Argentina already offers a lot of advantages to immigrants such as free medical care 
and free education all the way through college.  On top of this, for Venezuelan migrants 
Argentina has gone further by loosening entrance requirements, simplifying the residency 
process, and streamlining the degree accreditation process [translated from Spanish].”  He 
concluded by saying that providing additional assistance to migrants under Argentina’s current 
economic situation was unfeasible especially given that many natives are also struggling to make 
ends meet.   
Backlash from Argentine natives 
 
 Overall, there has been little backlash against Venezuelan migrants from Argentines 
according to Moujan.  An examination of newspaper articles over the past year seems to support 
this statement and shows that most Argentines are at least outwardly empathetic to the 
Venezuelan situation.  In Argentina, there have also not been reports of coordinated attacks 
against Venezuelan migrant communities as have notoriously occurred in other countries in the 
region.  The lack of significant backlash from natives makes sense especially given the low 
levels of discrimination reported by Venezuelan migrants in the Economic Integration Survey 
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and described in Chapter III.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that racial and ethnic stereotypes 
about Venezuelans in Argentina are likely present and negatively impact some Venezuelans’ 
ability to integrate socially and economically in Argentine society.     
Furthermore, Moujan also denies any friction between Argentine labor unions and the 
arrival of so many Venezuelan migrants.  He claims, “there have not been many cases of 
complaints from Argentine unions since Venezuelans as a whole do not compete with Argentines 
for jobs and because there is an understanding that there are job opportunities available for 
everyone, especially in the provinces [translated from Spanish].”  However, Sala has a less rosy 
image of labor relations between Argentine unions and migrants.  She specifically cited a recent 
confrontation between Argentine engineers and oil companies in Argentina where the Colegio de 
Ingenieros teamed up with the Oil Workers’ Union in petitioning that the government require 
that all foreign engineers have their degrees validated before being allowed to work in Argentina.  
Sala claims, “the large inflow of Venezuelan engineers and the feeling that they were competing 
for Argentine jobs precipitated the actions taken by the local unions [translated from Spanish].”  
In the end, pushback from the oil companies led to the failure of the bill.  In fact, according to 
Sala, the oil companies were instrumental in convincing the government to relax accreditation 
requirements for Venezuelans in the first place, citing the need for more engineers in the future 
development of the Vaca Muerta oil and gas fields.   
In general, Moujan says that by default most Argentines are not xenophobic and that 
clashes with migrants only typically occur when Argentines feel that their rights or interests are 
being unfairly infringed upon.  He uses the example of Senegalese migrants that put their 
products on a blanket to sell in front of stores.  Rather than having a problem with Senegalese 
migrants’ race or culture, Argentines are upset because the Senegalese are illegally competing 
against them by selling products on the street directly outside their storefronts.  Yet he says that 
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even this anger is misplaced as Argentines should be more upset at the state for failing to enforce 
the rule of law.   
Moujan attributes the openness of Argentines to migrants from other countries to the fact 
that many Argentines themselves move abroad in order to earn a better living.  Specifically, there 
is a large number of Argentines, many of whom have European passports thanks to their family 
origin, that have moved to Europe in response to Argentina’s own economic crisis.  While not as 
grave as in Venezuela, Argentina is also suffering from high inflation, rising unemployment, 
drops in GDP, and significant foreign debt.   
A recent news article from the Associated Press and published by the New York Times 
and Washington Post writes that Argentines are beginning to emigrate to Europe once again just 
as they had during the 2001-2002 economic crisis when nearly 800,000 Argentines moved 
abroad.  In the article, the DNM says that it is difficult to currently estimate the number of 
Argentines that have moved abroad since those that leave do not disclose their destination nor 
the length of time they will be out of the country.160  Because of their tendency to move abroad, 
Argentines are therefore more likely to be more sympathetic to economic migrants such as the 
Venezuelans in Argentina than are citizens of other countries where it is less common to move 
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In the Economic Integration Survey, respondents were asked if they plan to return to 
Venezuela if conditions improve.  As seen in Figure 56 above, 35.25% responded that they 
would return while 21.58% responded that they would not return.  The largest percentage of 
migrants (43.17%) said that they were unsure.  Respondents that answered yes or that they were 
unsure were then asked under what conditions they would return to Venezuela.   
Most responses cited the end of the Maduro regime and to the country’s socialist 
economic system.  Numerous responses also said they would only return once democracy was 
restored and there was an extended period of political, economic, and social stability.  The 
restoration of an independent judiciary and a return to free market policies were also commonly 
referenced conditions for returning.  Others also demanded that corrupt officials and those 
responsible for crimes against humanity be held accountable before a just court of law before 
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they return to Venezuela.  Additionally, many people said they would only return to Venezuela if 
the economic opportunities presented became the same or better than those that they currently 
have in Argentina.  Some of the responses are cited below:     
¿Bajo qué condiciones se mudaría de vuelta a Venezuela? 
 
“Salida del chavismo. Establecimiento de un regimen de libre mercado. Purga de bandas 
delictivas.” 
 
“Vuelta de la democracia en Venezuela. Salida de los narcos del poder.” 
 
“Cambio de gobierno, Garantia de un estado de derecho, una economía estable y mejores 
condiciones que garanticen un futuro” 
 
“1) Que se erradicara el chavismo y cualquier vestigio de socialismo. 2) Que la fuerza armada 
nacional y los cuerpos de policías y seguridad nacionales hagan su trabajo” 
 
“Se tenga un gobierno democrático y pueda asegurarme de vivir en las mismas condiciones 
económicas que en Argentina. Poder trabajar de lo que estudié. Se tengan los Servicios públicos 
asegurados” 
 
“Bajo unas condiciones económicas y sociales favorables. Donde no haya impunidad y haya 
medidas ejemplarizantes con prision y castigo a todo corrupto y asesino.” 
 
“Varios años de crecimiento económico y social.” 
 
“Recuperar empresas o invertir en las que ya existen” 
 
“Cuando se restablezca el estado de derecho a los ciudadanos, que las instituciones sean 
autonomas y no al servicio de la narcodictadura o de un partido politico de turno.” 
 
“No he pensado en eso. Quizás si las cosas fuesen mejor económicamente de lo que podría tener 
en argentina, además que la inseguridad y calidad de vida en vzla mejore” 
 
Overall satisfaction with living in Argentina  
 
As seen below in Figure 57, with a weighted average score of 4.04, the average 
respondent classified their experience in Argentina as being good and a total of 84% of 
respondents classified their experience as being good or excellent.   In Figure 58, nearly 71% of 
respondents considered themselves to be financially better or much better than they were most 
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migrants currently living in Argentina are likely to stay rather than re-migrate to another country.  
They also suggest that more Venezuelan migrants are likely to come to Argentina based on the 
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There are several reasons why Venezuelan migrants escaping crisis at home are drawn to 
Argentina.  For one thing, Argentina is a Spanish-speaking country with cultural and historical 
ties to Venezuela.  In addition, entry requirements are low due to Argentina’s continued 
recognition of Venezuelans’ Mercosur membership while exceptions have also been made for 
children without proper identification and migrants traveling with expired documents.  
Importantly, Argentina also offers free healthcare and public education through the university 
level to all members of society including immigrants.  Like entry requirements, residency 
requirements are relatively low and have also been further reduced for Venezuelan migrants.   
 Furthermore, the demographic and socioeconomic profiles of surveyed migrants in this 
thesis are similar to those cited in other studies about Venezuelan migration to Argentina.  Thus 
COLUMNS WEIGHT 
Mucho peor 1 
Peor 2 
Ni mejor ni peor 3 
Mejor 4 
Mucho mejor 5 
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far, Venezuelan migrants to Argentina are mostly young, middle to upper-middle class 
professionals.  Even though migrants are highly concentrated in Greater Buenos Aires, there are 
also sizable communities in secondary cities such as Cordoba as well as in the oil producing 
regions of Argentina.  Data gathered in the Economic Integration Survey regarding where 
respondents reside reflect similar trends as the data collected by the DNM.   
Easy residency requirements for Venezuelans also mean that most migrants are legally 
residing in Argentina and are eligible to work in the formal economy.  In fact, the data show that 
the percentage of survey respondents working in the formal economy exceeds the Argentine 
national average.  Additionally, very few respondents receive direct financial assistance from the 
government.  Less promising, however, are the high unemployment and underemployment rates 
among respondents of 36.03% and 51.72% respectively.  
Upon closer examination, the causes of underemployment of Venezuelan migrants in 
Argentina are various and often differ according to profession.  In the case of medical doctors, 
underemployment is more likely a temporary state and usually occurs in the time before degree 
accreditation is granted.  The high demand for medical doctors in Argentina means that jobs are 
typically available for Venezuelan doctors once they have their degrees accredited as long as 
they are willing to relocate outside of Buenos Aires.  In the case of engineers, underemployment 
is mostly at a macro-economic level and is a result of a weak Argentine economy and a 
mismatch between the skills of Venezuelan engineers and the demands of the Argentine 
economy.  Some engineers in Argentina also suffer from micro-underemployment resulting from 
age or gender discrimination.    
Recognizing the economic potential of Venezuelan migrants, the Argentine government 
has already taken important steps towards cutting down on migrant underemployment.  These 
include reducing requirements and expediting the process for degree accreditation, updating and 
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streamlining the residency application process, and helping migrants find available jobs in the 
interior of the country.  The latter point has been accomplished through better data collection 
techniques and the development of a digital employment search platform as part of a new 
initiative called Orientación de Fluyos Migratorios.   
Recommendations for further reducing underemployment among Venezuelan migrants 
were also made and include improving the accessibility of housing through offering government-
backed guarantees to landlords, reducing the cost of housing to migrants in areas where potential  
jobs are available, creating programs that offer inexpensive micro-credit to migrants looking to 
become entrepreneurs or independent contractors, fining employers who do not hire migrants 
with provisional residency as the law dictates they should, and permitting migrants to start the 
degree accreditation process earlier with only provisional residency.   
However, it is uncertain whether the Argentine government has the will or the resources 
currently to attempt some of these reforms.  The country is in the midst of its own economic 
crisis and is preparing for a change of government in December.  Currently, discrimination 
towards Venezuelan migrants from Argentines is reported to be low and public backlash to the 
country’s open immigrations policy has been negligible.  Yet, this may change if Argentines feel 
that migrants are given precedence over them by their own government during these tough 
economic times.  Moreover, reforms in the areas mentioned, however significant, would also 
only partially reduce underemployment.  Sound macro-economic policies that promote the 
growth of the Argentine economy are imperative to helping reduce underemployment.   
Overall, the outlook for Venezuelans in Argentina appears to be positive.  On average, 
respondents to the Economic Integration Survey rated their experience in Argentina as good and 
their financial positions as being much better than they were in Venezuela.  Not only has the 
Argentine government already taken important steps towards improving the economic 
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integration of Venezuelan migrants in Argentina, it is also likely to remain committed to 
accepting future migrants.  This is important given that the economic and political crises in 
Venezuela continue to rage on while other countries in the region, overwhelmed by the inflow of 
Venezuelan migrants, have started placing restrictions on the number of new migrants they are 
willing to accept.   
In conclusion, the Argentine government should be applauded for its response to the 
migratory crisis and the actions it has already taken to help Venezuelan migrants integrate 
economically into the Argentine labor market.  Nevertheless, high levels of underemployment 
among Venezuelan migrants show that there is still work to be done in finding ways to fully 
utilize the productive capacity of this new workforce.  This will no doubt be a challenge for the 
new Argentine government set to assume power in December especially given the severity of the 
current Argentine recession and the fragility of the national economy.  Nevertheless, 
policymakers should be assured that the benefits of reducing Venezuelan migrant 
underemployment have the potential to be far reaching- not only for migrants, but also for 
Argentina.   
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